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CHAPTER I 
“ONE OF THE BULWARKS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY” 1: THE LEGAL AND 
HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP OF EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 
 
On a clear, crisp December morning in 1862, Judge David Davis of the Illinois 8th 
Judicial Circuit climbed the steps of the U.S. Capitol building to be sworn in as the next 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.  His three-hundred pound frame 
carried a large round head, set upon a short neck.  His forehead was high, thinly shaded 
by gray-brown hair.  His full broad, double chinned face was clean shaven, down to a rim 
of light-gray whiskers, which ran around from ear to ear under his jaw.2   
At twelve o’clock noon, he followed Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and his 
associates in a procession into the chamber of the Supreme Court.  Taney unrolled a 
parchment announcing that they had received the commission of David Davis, and 
ordered it read by the clerk.  The Chief Justice then asked, “Is Mr. Davis ready to take the 
oath?”  Davis bowed his head, took the parchment, read it, and kissed the Bible.  He then 
                                                          
1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1935), 427. 
2 Harry E. Pratt, “David Davis” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1930), 118.  
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adjourned into the corridor where he was robed in fourteen yards of black silk.  The 
Court rose as the U.S. Marshal escorted Davis to his seat on the extreme left of the Chief 
Justice.  The justices all bowed, he bowed in response, then took his seat.3  For the next 
fifteen years David Davis helped interpret and frame the supreme law of the land.  Over 
the course of the American Civil War he had evolved into an eminent jurist, devoted to 
defending the civil liberties of Northern citizens.  After directly intervening on behalf of 
several Northern Peace Democrats who faced trial by military commission, Davis struck 
down the use of these tribunals in the landmark case ex parte Milligan.                  
This thesis will attempt to place the 1866 Supreme Court case ex parte Milligan 
and its author, David Davis, in the historical context of the American Civil War and 
Reconstruction.  It is a story of vital importance to both legal historians and Civil War-era 
historians.  Davis’s letters and papers have been reexamined with particular attention to 
his political views and his development as a judge and civil libertarian.  Radical 
Republican reaction to Milligan in both newspapers and the Congressional Globe have 
also been reevaluated to better understand the Radicals’ interpretation of Davis’s majority 
opinion.  While Radical Republicans viewed ex parte Milligan as both a condemnation of 
the Lincoln administration’s use of military commissions during the Civil War and as an 
attack on Congressional Reconstruction, ironically Davis did not intend for his ruling to 
apply to the Reconstruction South where he thought the use of military commissions 
might remain constitutional.  As a common law, circuit court judge, Davis became 
increasingly concerned with civil liberties issues during the Civil War and directly 
                                                          
3 Pratt, “David Davis,”119.  
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intervened on behalf of Peace Democrats who faced many of these violations.  This did 
not mean he opposed a vigorous pursuit of military reconstruction in the post-war South.    
Simultaneously, this study will follow Davis’s growing anti-Partyism over the 
course of his life and career, thus explaining, in part, his opposition to both Radical 
Republicans and Peace Democrats.  This anti-Partyism also explains why he was able to 
rise above the political fray and stand up for the civil liberties of Peace Democrats and 
why, in Milligan, he did not go so far as to prohibit Radical-backed military commissions 
in the South.  He consistently maintained a judicial middle-ground.  The problem with the 
existing literature of David Davis, ex parte Milligan, and the judicial politics of 
Reconstruction, is that historians have failed to place Davis and his majority opinion in 
the historical framework of civil liberties during the Civil War and Reconstruction.  This 
work intends to fill that scholarly void.                 
On December 17, 1866, the United States Supreme Court handed down its 
landmark decision in ex parte Milligan, declaring that the military trial of civilians was 
unconstitutional when the civilian courts were open and functioning.4  Sixty-nine years 
later, in 1935, legal historian Charles Warren hailed the decision as “one of the bulwarks 
of American civil liberties” and paid equal homage to its author, Justice David Davis.5  
Despite being issued a year after the American Civil War, Ex parte Milligan  has 
been often cited in subsequent legal cases in order to check presidential actions during 
wartime in the interest of protecting civil liberties.  It can be said that the decision in Ex 
                                                          
4 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866).  
5  Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 427.  
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parte Milligan was not settled in 1866 and, in recent Supreme Court decisions regarding 
military commissions, remains unsettled.  As legal scholar Curtis Bradley has noted, 
“The extent to which Milligan restricted military jurisdiction was unclear even at the time 
of the decision…[a]pplying the decision a century and a half later…in the wake of 
significant intervening precedent and substantial changes in the nature of the country and 
of the world, leaves substantial room for judicial discretion.”6  This judicial discretion, as 
we will see, has led to broadly different interpretations and applications of Milligan.  In 
addition to legal precedent, there are two other sources for the case’s interpretation: 
constitutional scholarship and legal history.            
  Since the case was handed down in 1866, there has been a long and complicated 
history of attorneys and judges interpreting Milligan where it has been cited in 
subsequent legal cases relating to presidential war powers, the role of courts during 
wartime, and even the classification of non-traditional combatants.7  Shadowing this 
battle in the courts, legal scholars and historians continued to write about Milligan from 
widely diverging points of view and for a variety of reasons.  It is therefore vital to 
understand the difference between legal scholarship and historical scholarship and how 
they intersect within legal history.  Legal scholars associated with law schools, such as 
Dan Farber and Paul Finkelman tend to focus on constitutional law and theory.  They see 
law as fundamentally different from politics.  As legal historian Michael Les Benedict 
                                                          
6 Curtis A. Bradley, “The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and 
Congressional Authorization” in Presidential Power Stories, eds. Christopher H. Schroeder and Curtis A. 
Bradley (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2009), 130. 
7 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1945), Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), Hamdi v. 
Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th 
Cir. 2005), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
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aptly explains, “[P]olitics is about the exercise of power, while law is about the 
application of rules.”8  From this particular perspective, after the political process has 
established a constitutional provision, its legal interpretation is left to the judiciary.  
Therefore, in the context of the Constitution, legal scholars have determined the “original 
intent” of the framers and how judges today should interpret constitutional law in a 21st 
century society.9  This dichotomy between politics and law will be extremely important 
to remember when we explore Davis’s own views on how politics and law interacted 
with one another.  Davis himself strove to rise above the political fray when considering 
the application and interpretation of law.  Whether he was successful in doing so, will be 
explored in the coming chapters.             
Legal historians, conversely, do not study legal history for legal purposes, but to 
understand why things happened the way they did and how they have affected the 
subsequent course of events.  Possessing a wider vision of constitutional politics, legal 
historians see the framing and consequences of Civil War and Reconstruction era law as 
part of a much longer and broader political process in which judges played a smaller role.  
Thus, constitutional law is one piece in the larger puzzle of our constitutional system.  As 
Benedict again notes, “Even the histories of the Reconstruction era that attend the most 
closely to constitutional issues do not try to tease out exact understandings and intentions 
                                                          
8 Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: Essays on Politics and the Constitution in 
the Reconstruction Era (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), ix.    
9 Benedict, Preserving the Constitution, ix-x.  
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[of the framers].”10  In other words, judges were creating new law rather than interpreting 
old law.  
As noted earlier, after Milligan was handed down in 1866, the case lay dormant 
for an extended period of time.  In the years after Reconstruction, few legal situations 
arose in which military commissions were deemed necessary; however, in the waning 
years of the 19th century, historians and political scientists began to examine the Civil 
War within the halls of the academy.  Twenty-two years after Milligan, historian William 
A. Dunning, John Burgess, and Sydney Fisher gave their analysis of the case.  In 1887, 
Dunning, who greatly influenced later generations of Reconstruction scholars, noted how 
the use of military commissions remained unchecked by the Supreme Court throughout 
the war.  Dunning saw this as the Court being intimated by the Radicals.  Milligan, he 
concluded, provided an opportunity for the Court to reassert its judicial authority.  He 
labeled the Milligan case, therefore, an act of “judicial hostility to Congress.”11  This 
thesis views Dunning’s assertion that the Court had been intimidated by the Radicals and 
hostile towards Congress as somewhat exaggerated.  While Davis did make an obiter 
dicta statement against Congressional power to establish military commissions, as an 
obiter dicta statement, it was not binding.  Obviously he was hostile toward Congress, yet 
this did not mean that Davis opposed the use of military commissions in the South.     
                                                          
10 Ibid., x.  
11 William A. Dunning, “The Constitution of the United States in Reconstruction,” Political 
Science Quarterly 2 (December 1887): 558-602, quoted in Peter J. Barry, “Ex parte Milligan: History and 
Historians,” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013), 362.   
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Indeed, Davis left the authority of military commissions in the South 
unchallenged.  In defense of arbitrary power during war, political essayist Sydney Fisher 
stated in 1888 that: 
It is generally admitted that when a government is attacked 
by a rebellion it is impossible for it to protect itself from 
conspirators and assassins if every one of them has to be 
taken before a court of law and proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In such a crisis some arbitrary power 
must be given. 
 
Fisher saw Milligan playing “havoc with the theories that prevailed during the war.”12  
Burgess also wrote a pessimistic assessment of Milligan’s long-term authority.  In 1891 
he wrote, “It is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the court may never be subject 
to the strain of actual war.  If, however, it should be, we may safely predict that it will be 
necessarily disregarded.”13  These comments have proven prophetic.  Instead of focusing 
on Milligan’s impact on Reconstruction, however, Fisher and Burgess established a 
conversation about Milligan’s impact on America’s legal apparatus involving civilians 
and military relations during wartime.  That conversation would remain unchanged for 
generations to come.  This study will attempt to shift that conversation away from a legal 
and political theory context and toward an historical context in which David Davis, 
Milligan, and the Civil War era are studied as a whole.               
                                                          
12 Sydney G. Fisher, “The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion,” 
Political Science Quarterly 3 (September 1888): 478, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 363.  
13 John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (Boston: Ginn & 
Company, 1891): 251, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 362.     
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Understandably, early 20th century historians continued the discussion of Milligan 
during World War I.  However, an historical analysis of the case, specifically in regards 
to how it affected Reconstruction and David Davis’s role, was still absent from the 
scholarly conversation. The discussion still centered on a strictly legal viewpoint.  
Several legal scholars responded to Congress when it amended the Articles of War to 
guarantee the authority of military commissions during World War I.  University of 
Minnesota Law Professor Henry J. Fletcher commented on the Milligan case in 1917 
stating, “Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial 
process.”14  Conversely, in his 1920 book, Freedom of Speech, Harvard Law Professor 
and civil libertarian Zechariah Chafee Jr. firmly believed that the Bill of Rights should 
hold under both war and peace and cited Milligan as a part of this fundamental principle. 
“A majority of the Supreme Court declared the war power of Congress to be restricted by 
the Bill of Rights in ex parte Milligan, which cannot be lightly brushed aside.”15  This is 
the same reasoning that Davis took in his majority opinion.  Perhaps the most influential 
and comprehensive work on the legal history of the Civil War and Reconstruction is J.G. 
Randall’s 1926 book Constitutional Problems under Lincoln.  In regards to the split 
between Davis’s majority opinion in Milligan which declared Congress did not have 
power to authorize military commissions outside a war zone and Chief Justice Salmon P. 
Chase’s concurring opinion which would have upheld Congressional but not executive 
power to establish home-front military commissions. Randall observed that this left “the 
                                                          
14 Henry J. Fletcher, “The Civilian and the War Power,” Minnesota Law Review 2 (1917): 130, 
quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 364.  
15 Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920): 33, 
quoted in Barry: “Ex parte Milligan,” 364.  
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impression of a court about to swing from one opinion to another.”16  As we will see, this 
split, in fact, was the hinge upon which Milligan decidedly affected Reconstruction.  If 
one accepts the premise that Chase was representative of Radical Republicans, Davis 
provides an opposing view to Congressional Radicals and their constitutional authority 
during Reconstruction.  Yet, as we will see, Davis’s and Chase’s opinions were not all 
that different.  The “split” as Randall observed, came down to a misinterpretation of 
where Davis objected to the use of military commissions.          
In 1929, legal scholar Samuel Klaus published a seminal piece The Milligan Case, 
which included the proceedings of the military commission that tried Milligan and the 
briefs submitted to the United States Supreme Court.  Klaus minimized the significance 
of the case by citing a 60 year span of time marked by no situation that dictated the 
suspension of habeas corpus or the trial of civilians by military commissions.  Klaus 
asserted, “It is precisely for this rare and crucial situation that Ex Parte Milligan purports 
to assert a rule of judicial decision.”17  This thesis, however, will argue that the 
significance of Milligan does not reside in its standing as legal precedent as Klaus and his 
predecessors have contended.  Milligan’s significance resides more generally as a part of 
the evolution of civil liberties thinking in the North coming out of the Civil War and is 
thus of enormous historical significance, despite its legal obscurity.   
                                                          
16 James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1926): 176, quoted in Barry: “Ex parte Milligan,” 365.   
17 Samuel Klaus, ed., The Milligan Case (New York: Knopf, 1929): 62, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte 
Milligan,” 366.  
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Ironically, that “rare and crucial situation,” as Klaus put it, came quickly with the 
advent of World War II.  Attorney and civil libertarian John P. Frank took a favorable 
position on Milligan in 1944.  In “Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law 
in Hawaii,” Frank, repeated Charles Fairman, in stating that the Milligan opinion was a 
“bulwark for the protection of the civil liberties of every American citizen.”18  He 
concluded that the U.S. Constitution applied in Hawaii and, therefore, the military trials 
of civilians on the island were illegal.  Once again, finding answers to military authority 
during wartime precluded any historical scholarship on Milligan, David Davis, and the 
Civil War era.  Failing to contextualize Milligan properly during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction left out an entirely new and significant perspective on how law and 
politics interacted.                
The Cold War again provided a period in which the question of military trials of 
civilians was temporarily put to rest.  Because there were no active hostilities during this 
period, military commissions were not called upon to try civilians.  However, 1960s 
liberalism placed Milligan back onto the examination table.  Although not a figure of the 
1960s, but rather a mid-century intellectual, Allan Nevins saw Lambdin P. Milligan as 
simply a “loose cannon” in an era of sectionalism and did not deserve historical attention.  
Nevins’s characterization of Lambdin P. Milligan as unimportant has largely been 
discredited by today’s expanding historical scholarship on Peace Democrats and the 
Northern war resistance.  Much of this will be explored in chapter 2.  According to 
                                                          
18 John P. Frank, “Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii,” Columbia 
Law Review 44 (September 1944): 639, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 368.  
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Nevins though, the political situation that created the case was more important.  He 
explained, “Although Lincoln was the last man in the world to make himself such a 
despot, he might conceivably have a successor someday who, unless a clear line were 
drawn, would permit the erection of a martial autocracy.  The line was now emphatically 
delineated.”19  In other words, Milligan created a legal barricade for any future president 
who might want to expand military rule even further than what it had been during the 
Civil War.   
In his 1968 book, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics, revisionist 
historian Stanley Kutler challenged Dunning’s opinion that the Court had been 
intimidated by the Radical Republicans.  Rather, the Court conducted itself with 
“forcefulness and not timidity, by judicious self-imposed restraint rather than retreat, by 
boldness and defiance instead of cowardice and impotence.”20  Milligan, therefore, was a 
reflection of the Court’s attempt to reassert its constitutional authority and to preserve 
civil liberties in the framework of American government by striking down expanded 
executive and legislative power.  Like his predecessors, however, Kutler left the story of 
Milligan’s impact on Reconstruction untold.  This thesis comes closest to finishing 
Kutler’s story: the Court did show “judicious self-imposed restraint.” Davis’s majority 
opinion in Milligan did preserve civil liberties in America by striking down military 
commissions.  I contend, however, that by intent Milligan only applied to the North.  
                                                          
19 Allan Nevins, “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,” in Quarrels That Have Shaped the 
Constitution, ed. John A Garraty (New York: Harper, 1964): 108, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 
370.  
20 Stanley Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1968): 92, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 370.  
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Considering his opposition to Radical Republicans, Davis showed great self-restraint 
when he allowed Radical-backed military commissions in the South to remain in place.    
In 1970, archivist Joseph P. Gambone confirmed Kutler’s impression of 
Milligan’s importance for judicial supremacy and civil liberties.  He concluded, “By 
virtue of the Milligan decision, the Supreme Court restored itself to a position of greater 
prestige, and reaffirmed its position as the ‘final arbiter of the Constitution’”21  This was 
a part of a larger process that was rapidly resulting in the rise of judicial supremacy in the 
late nineteenth century.  Charles Fairman revisited the Milligan case in 1971 whereby he 
largely reiterated his analysis in 1942.  However, he qualified his earlier findings by 
stating that “the very words of the Milligan opinion should not be taken as precise test for 
all future emergencies.”22  In other words, judges may, over time, contemplate different 
applications of Milligan to new military or national security situations. For legal scholars 
then, this is the heart of evolving legal interpretation.  Yet, the historical significance of 
Milligan and its author in the context of the Civil War and Reconstruction has yet to be 
explored.         
Another decade would pass before a historian would again take up the question of 
Milligan’s historical significance.  In regards to the author of Milligan, historian Harold 
Hyman declared in 1982 declared that “Justice Davis paid the Bill of Rights such respects 
as had not sounded in the chamber since Taney’s tribute to the Fifth Amendment in Dred 
                                                          
21 Joseph G. Gambone, “Ex Parte Milligan: The Restoration of Judicial Prestige?” Civil War 
History 16 (September, 1970): 259, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 371.    
22 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1971), 233.  
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Scott.”23  Hyman’s statement was deeply ironic given that Taney declared the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited the federal government from freeing 
slaves brought into federal territory.24  The only other Bill of Rights case that came 
before the Supreme Court, prior to the Civil War, was Barron v. Baltimore (1833).  In 
this case, the Court declared that the Bill of Rights could not be applied to state 
governments.25  Nonetheless, Davis in his majority opinion would use the Due Process 
Clause (in part) to strike down the use of military commissions in the North.  Starting 
with Nevins, historical analysis of Milligan finally started to take hold.  Yet, the analysis 
was focused on the case’s place in antebellum legal history and its impact on the 
Supreme Court’s authority.  This was very useful but scholars still had not addressed the 
case’s impact on the civil liberties issues coming out of the Civil War, Davis’s role, or the 
way the Reconstruction political context might provide a key to its meaning.        
Legal historian, Mark Neely Jr., explored the “irrelevancy” of the decision in his 
1991 treatise, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties.  He concluded 
that the 1866 case was inapplicable during wartime, since it was decided during 
peacetime.  Therefore, “the real legacy of Ex Parte Milligan is confined between the 
covers of constitutional history books.  The decision itself had little effect on history.”26  
This thesis directly challenges Neely’s assertion.  As the story unfolds in the proceeding 
chapters, David Davis and Milligan had a significant impact on Reconstruction, not in the 
                                                          
23 Harold Hyman and William M. Weicek, Equal Justice Under the Law: Constitutional 
Development, 1835-1875 (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 382.   
24 Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
25 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).   
26 Mark Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991): 184, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 374.  
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opinion itself but rather in the way Radical Republicans viewed the opinion as an attack 
on Congressional Reconstruction.          
Five years later, in 1996, Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s All 
the Laws but One provided a unique perspective on Milligan.  He concluded that: 
The Milligan decision is justly celebrated for its rejection 
of the government’s position that the Bill of Rights has no 
application in wartime. It would have been a sounder 
decision, and much more widely approved at the time, had 
it not gone out of its way to declare that Congress had no 
authority to do that which it never tried to do.27   
 
Justice Rehnquist’s evaluation of Davis’s majority opinion in which he declared 
Congress did not have the authority to establish military commissions is particularly 
germane to this thesis.  As we will see, Davis’s statement on Congressional power 
triggered Radical understanding of Milligan as an attack on Congressional 
Reconstruction.  It is therefore understandable why Congress launched several attacks on 
the Supreme Court soon thereafter, such as reducing its membership and restricting its 
appellate jurisdiction.        
The post-9/11 world provided another opportunity to shed new light on Milligan.  
In a 2003 article for The Nation, Eric Foner commented on the threats to civil liberties 
during wartime: 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, a far greater crisis than 
the war on Iraq, the Supreme Court in the Milligan case 
invalidated the use of military tribunals to try civilians.  
                                                          
27 William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: Vintage, 
1998): 137, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 375.  
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The Court proclaimed that the Constitution is not 
suspended in wartime…Alas we have not always lived up 
to this ideal.  The history of civil liberties in the United 
States is not always a straight-line trajectory toward ever 
greater freedom.  It is a complex story in which victories 
can prove temporary and regression can follow progress.28            
 
Foner gave a full-throated endorsement to the heroic liberal view of the Davis opinion 
even while admitting that the decision had often been honored only in the breech.  
Remarkably, our foremost historian of Reconstruction did little to contextualize the Davis 
opinion in the field of his own expertise.     
Constitutional scholars John Yoo and Curtis Bradley addressed Milligan in the 
context of post-9/11 military detentions and tribunals.  Yoo was a Deputy Assistant U.S. 
Attorney General during the Bush Administration and the author of the “Torture Memo” 
which greatly expanded executive authority in the context of enhanced interrogation 
techniques.   In 2008, Yoo declared that “Milligan was not just a vindication of 
Merryman, but a dramatic expansion of it.”29  Milligan elicited a broader question: does 
the suspension of habeas corpus allow for the military trial of civilians? Yoo’s analysis is 
somewhat shortsighted.  Merryman, in effect, established nothing because Lincoln 
ignored it.  Additionally, Davis did not strike down Lincoln’s executive suspension of 
habeas corpus.    Yoo went on to criticize Milligan by defending the use of military 
commissions and opposing the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing executive authority 
                                                          
28 Eric Foner, “Dare Call It Treason,” The Nation, June 2, 2003 quoted in Barry, “Ex parte 
Milligan,” 376. 
29 John Yoo, “Merryman and Milligan,” Journal of Supreme Court History 34 (November 2008), 
519. 
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during wartime.  For Yoo, allowing the Court to review military commission proceedings 
“ignores the costs of judicial intervention…to the war effort.”30     
 In 2009, Curtis Bradley concluded that “[p]erhaps the greatest significance of 
Milligan is symbolic rather than doctrinal.  [It] provides a precedential counterweight to 
claims of unlimited government authority in wartime.”31  A national crisis, again, 
advanced the question of military authority over civilians, leaving historical analysis on 
the back-burner.  Yoo and Bradley briefly examined the case’s historical relevance and 
impact on Civil War era civil liberties, but left the question of Reconstruction and the 
reasoning behind Justice Davis’ majority opinion, wholly unanswered.    
 Despite the attention lavished on ex parte Milligan, the literature on David Davis 
nevertheless remains quite scarce.  The earliest known biography is a 1930 unpublished 
PhD dissertation by Harry E. Pratt from the University of Illinois.  Pratt was the first to 
use Davis’s personal papers in writing this first-ever biography of the judge.  This 
dissertation was simply a blow-by-blow account of Davis’s life with no discernable thesis 
or argument.  Likewise, its treatment of Milligan was simply matter-of-fact and adduced 
that it was Davis’s “best work.”32  There is no mention of how Davis and his opinion 
impacted civil liberties issues during the Civil War-era.   
Not until 1960 did another biography of Davis appear in the historical literature.  
Chicago attorney Willard King’s Lincoln’s Manager: David Davis was much more 
                                                          
30 Yoo, “Merryman and Milligan,” 533.  
31 Bradley, “The Story of Ex parte Milligan,” 376.  
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expansive than Pratt’s.  It included then-recently discovered Davis family letters which 
allowed him to develop a more detailed story of the judge’s life.  However, much like 
Pratt’s work, King’s biography was merely a narrative.  “David Davis’s chief 
contribution to American history was the part he played in the nomination of Abraham 
Lincoln…Had Judge Davis not lived, Lincoln would not have been nominated.”33  In 
other words, King did not bring to the forefront Davis’s role in civil liberties during the 
Civil War.  Rather he simply focused on a brief moment in a larger, more significant 
career as a Supreme Court justice.  King’s analysis of Milligan’s significance fell short as 
well.  He simply quoted Charles Warren in calling the opinion “one of the bulwarks of 
American liberty” and claimed that “it stands in all the grandeur of its original 
utterance.”34  By 1960, no historian had yet outlined the historical significance of David 
Davis in the context of ex parte Milligan and the Civil War and Reconstruction.             
In 2009, Connecticut attorney William D. Bader and former Chief Justice Frank J. 
Williams of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, wrote a biography of Davis in the Roger 
Williams University Law Review, entitled, “David Davis: Lawyer, Judge, and Politician 
in the Age of Lincoln.”  Once again, this work was long on narrative and short on 
legal/historical argument.  Bader and Williams’ view of Davis’s significance was, 
“Besides his authorship of Ex Parte Milligan…He pioneered a movement toward 
implementing an intermediate court of appeals in the federal court system…and his 
actions as a United States Senator helped shape the structure of today’s federal 
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judiciary.”35  It stands to reason that two members of the legal community would form 
their study of Davis around his impact on the current day judicial system rather than his 
impact on history.  But their view of Milligan’s significance simply rested in its use as a 
legal precedent and not in its significance for Civil War era history.      
The judicial politics of Reconstruction are vital to understanding the environment 
in which the case was understood by public opinion, specifically Radical Republicans.  
The most recent scholarship on judicial politics during Reconstruction is Pamela 
Brandwein’s Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction.  Brandwein challenges 
the popularly held notion that during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, the Supreme 
Court assisted in restoring white supremacy in the South by narrowly interpreting the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  She argues that scholars have 
overlooked the ways in which the Waite court (1874-1888) allowed for the federal 
protection of African Americans in the South, protections that successive Congresses and 
presidencies failed to afford them.  She notes that while members of the Waite court such 
as Joseph Bradley and Samuel Miller ruled that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not guarantee equal access to public accommodations, they did not 
intend to leave African Americans in the hands of southern white supremacy.  Instead, 
she shows how the Court drew a legal distinction between social, political, and civil 
rights.  The Court held that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments did not 
provide for equal access to public spaces, but they did allow for federal protection in 
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18.   
  
19 
 
national elections if black voters were being subjected to intimidation, violence, or fraud.  
Additionally, the Court maintained that the federal government could intervene locally if 
states purposefully failed to protect African Americans’ due process rights or property 
rights.  It is true that the Fuller court (1888-1910) finally sanctioned Jim Crow, but they 
had to first overturn these important Waite court decisions. 36           
This thesis joins Brandwein in arguing that the blame for the failure of 
Reconstruction should not be laid on the Supreme Court the way it has been.  I, however, 
push this interpretation of the Reconstruction courts back to David Davis’s 1866 majority 
opinion in Milligan.  While Davis struck down military commissions in the North, he left 
executive authority intact in the South, where it could be used to protect freedmen from 
all-white courts and juries.  As we will see in chapter 5, in more than one case, Davis 
sided with the majority to uphold military commissions in the South.          
In sum, legal scholars have examined Milligan in order to understand the role of 
presidential war power, the role of courts during wartime, and the classification of non-
traditional combatants.  Historians have done much the same, just within an historical 
context and less from a legal standpoint. Still, the controlling unanswered questions that 
lie at the heart of all this historiography, is what is the historical importance of David 
Davis and Ex parte Milligan in the context of civil liberties issues during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction; and what is the place of Milligan in the rise of Judicial Supremacy 
based on the Bill of Rights?  I intend to fill this scholarly void by examining how David 
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Davis emerged as a civil libertarian during the American Civil War, how his 
constitutional and anti-Partysim views helped shape Ex parte Milligan, and why Radical 
Republicans misinterpreted this opinion as an attack on Congressional Reconstruction in 
the South.   This chapter in American history has not been told in large part because 
Abraham Lincoln has overshadowed Davis.  Yet, this thesis will rely heavily on 
Lincoln’s correspondence with Davis in order to understand the man and the jurist and to 
finally give him his long overdue recognition.        
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CHAPTER II 
DAVID DAVIS: JURIST AND CIVIL LIBERTARIAN                                                                           
 
 
 
During a war replete with civil liberties issues, the military trial of Lamdin P. 
Milligan and his co-conspirators in the fall of 1864 was a particularly prominent civil 
liberties case.  Many of these civil liberties issues were raised by Peace Democrats, also 
known as Copperheads who strongly opposed the Northern war effort.  Interestingly, 
Judge David Davis intervened on behalf of many of these Copperheads who had been 
arrested and tried before military commissions for voicing their discontent with the 
Lincoln administration. A fundamental understanding of David Davis’s anti-Partyism and 
his maturation as a civil libertarian during the Civil War is therefore necessary to fully 
appreciate the legal landscape that brought Milligan to trial in the winter of 1864.  Thus 
we can begin to understand the political environment in which Davis decided the 
Milligan case and how it was understandably misinterpreted by Radical Republicans.    
David Davis was born on the slave-holding Rounds Plantation in Cecil County, 
Maryland in 1815.  He was nursed by a slave woman and grew up playing with the 
African-American children on the plantation.  At age five, when Davis’s grandfather 
died, he inherited two slave boys who were sold the next year by his legal guardian.  This 
Southern environment produced in Davis a fervent hatred of Abolitionism. 
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Many, particularly in Eastern Maryland, hated abolitionists. 37  In 1820, Davis was sent to 
live with his paternal uncle, Reverend Henry Lyon Davis, in Annapolis.  The Reverend 
was a staunch supporter of Henry Clay and instilled his pro-Clay, moderately anti-slavery 
beliefs in his nephew at an early age.  Through his uncle’s influence, Davis himself 
became a follower of Clay and later a member of the Whig Party. 38  This political 
affiliation fostered his adherence to the rule of law and a high view of judicial authority 
which became one of the foundational blocks of his majority opinion in Milligan.  
In 1832, Davis graduated from Kenyon College and then proceeded to study law 
under Henry Bishop in Lennox, Massachusetts.  During this time, he became close to his 
future father-in-law, Judge William Perrin Walker.  Judge Walker’s opposition to both 
slavery and abolitionism reinforced Davis’s own views on human bondage as well as on 
extremist politics.  Davis went on to attend Yale Law School graduating in 1835, after 
which he moved to Pekin, Illinois to begin the practice of law.  One year later, he moved 
his law practice to Bloomington after buying an office from local attorney Jesse Fell.  It 
was during this time in Bloomington that his passion for politics began to grow.  As an 
outspoken Whig, Davis campaigned for William Henry Harrison and protested the 
annexation of Texas.39  In 1844, Davis was elected to the Illinois legislature where he 
served as a leading Whig until 1847.40     
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In the early 1830s, the Whig Party was formed in response to a perceived 
usurpation of executive power by Andrew Jackson.  From this position, they promoted 
congressional authority over the executive, a high view of the courts and the constitution, 
and a close adherence to the rule of law.  Moreover, they believed in the elastic clause 
and judicial construction.41  This Whiggish background may explain, in part, Davis’s 
decision in Milligan.  While both Lincoln and Davis came out of the Whig tradition, 
Davis upheld the law at all costs.  Lincoln, however, seemed to assume there could be no 
law without order first.  In defense of suspending habeas corpus during the Civil War, 
Lincoln famously asked, were “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”42  And in his speech on the 
Dred Scott decision in 1857, Lincoln willingly acknowledged that even the Supreme 
Court decisions were rooted in public opinion, opinion that could be shaped.43   Thus 
Lincoln viewed constitutional law in more plastic, political, and republican terms.   
In April 1844, when the Democratic Convention convened, Martin Van Buren 
was passed over for James Polk as the nominee.  The Whig nominee, Henry Clay, made a 
politically fatal mistake by opposing the annexation of Texas.  In response, the Liberty 
Party, backed by the political abolitionists, took enough Whig votes from Clay to defeat 
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him, resulting in Polk’s election, or at least this was how Lincoln and Davis saw it.  After 
seeing his political hero defeated and never having another chance at winning the 
presidency due to his age, Davis remarked to his father-in-law, “The abolitionists are 
hereafter and forevermore shut out of the pale of my sympathy.”44  While Lincoln later 
worked closely with Owen Lovejoy and Charles Sumner on emancipation, this lack of 
sympathy for abolitionists and their extremist politics on Davis’s part would continue 
well into the Civil War and thus have a significant impact on Davis’s opposition to 
Radical Republicans.45 
Likewise, Davis equally despised extremist Democrats known as Locofocos.  In 
1840, anti-Tammany Democrats were given this name by Whigs when an incident in 
which leaders of the Democratic Tammany Society in New York attempted to disrupt a 
meeting of the Young Mechanics in the Society by turning off the gas lights.  In response, 
the men held their meeting by the light of matches called “locofocos.”  Locofocos 
supported Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren and advocated free trade, greater 
circulation of specie, and opposed state banks, all of which flew in the face of Whiggish 
ideology.46  In a letter to Julius Rockwell, Davis said, “if some of our Lenox 
[Masschusetts] friends were to witness the genuine effects of Loco focoism in Illinois, 
they would not plume themselves greatly upon their adherence to the fortunes of Mr. Van 
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Buren.”47  Davis again wrote Rockwell the following year complaining about the decline 
of the Whig party in Illinois. “The printing of P[ost] O[ffice] D[epartment] is given to the 
vilest Loco Foco print in the State.  Mr. [Daniel] Webster has taken the printing from all 
the Whig papers in the West & bestowed it upon the filthiest of the papers opposed to 
us.”48  Davis also placed blame upon the radical Democrats for the Mexican War.  “This 
Mexican War must certainly open the eyes of the American people to the iniquities of 
Loco Focoism. This Mexican War is playing hob with all business men.  Don’t you think 
the Loco Foco party will ruin the Country?”49  It is unclear as to whether Davis thought 
that Loco focos were directly responsible for the bank and free trade issues thought to 
have been caused by the war, or simply that the army was taking business men as 
recruits.  Either way, it is clear that he despised the extremist wing of the Democratic 
Party.      
In the spring of 1847, Davis was elected to the Constitutional Convention which 
met that June.  The president of the convention assigned Davis only to the committee on 
Law Reform.  In this capacity, he helped set up separate supreme and circuit court judges 
to be elected by the people instead of by the legislature.  This was an attempt to insulate 
judges from direct political manipulation.  It came on the heels of a court packing scheme 
whereby the Democrats in the General Assembly increased the size of the court and put 
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Stephen A. Douglas on it in order to reverse a court ruling.50 So in the context of this 
thesis, fixing the size of the Court by constitution rather than by simple law might have 
been a move in the direction of something akin to what we later came to call judicial 
supremacy.     
As in the Illinois General Assembly, the question of African American 
immigration into the state was the product of much heated debate at the Constitutional 
Convention.  Davis actively fought the prohibition of black immigration as it would 
offend the northern portion of Illinois.  Here we can see early signs of Davis’s views on 
civil liberties and the constitution; perhaps views that would later influence his opinion in 
Milligan.  Even though Davis held prejudicial views himself and in fact personally 
opposed black immigration into Illinois, he placed his own views aside.  In his mind, he 
had been sent to the constitutional convention to remedy certain problems in the state 
government and was not willing to endanger the constitution’s adoption by this or any 
other provision.51  He would take the same non-partisan stance in Milligan by defending 
the civil liberties of extremist Democrats and at the same time maintaining Radical-
backed military commissions in the South.                    
After leaving the legislature, Davis was nominated as a Whig candidate for judge 
in the newly organized Illinois Eighth Judicial Circuit and was elected without opposition 
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in September of 1848.  He served in this position until his appointment to the United 
States Supreme Court in 1862.  As slavery became an increasingly volatile issue in the 
1850s and as some Whigs began to abolitionize, Judge Davis feared for his party’s future.  
In a letter to his cousin, Julius Rockwell, Davis wrote his assessment of the Kansas-
Nebraska Bill.  “Sumner talks unnecessarily saucy.  The Southern Senators are not so 
much to blame as these scoundrels at the North.  I regret the movement on this question 
of slavery, being really afraid that a sectional issue will be made disastrous to this 
country.  Try to save the Whig party.  I don’t fancy its being abolitionized.”52  Like many 
northern Whigs during this schism in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 
Davis immediately joined the Republican Party; as opposed to other Whigs who went to 
the Know-Nothing Party and then to the Republican Party (Mary Lincoln) or those who 
went to the Know-Nothing Party and then to the Democrats (John Todd Stuart).53  Like 
Lincoln, Davis took the more direct route from Whig to Republican.  In a letter to his 
brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, Davis wrote, “Every additional trip to Maryland 
confirms me in my desire to live in a free State.”54  As a conservative Republican, Davis 
vehemently opposed slavery and continued to see Abolitionists as “insincere demagogues 
striving for public office at the expense of the public weal.”55  Lincoln was extremely 
cagey in 1854-1856, but once the Whig Party was really most sincerely dead, he was 
willing to work with abolitionists. We do not see Davis as a civil libertarian at this point 
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in his life though.  He was more concerned with the people’s welfare than with individual 
liberty.   
This would change during the Civil War as concerns for individual civil liberties 
(for white men) impeded more heavily on his mind.  In her 2008 dissertation entitled, “A 
Dilemma of Civil Liberties: Blacks under Union Military Control, 1861-1866, Karin 
Petlack argued that “when the Union Army suppressed white Americans’ freedom of 
speech and threatened punishment for any sort of violent behavior during the war…the 
black community was able to establish black newspapers, expand their religious 
institutions, and increase educational offerings with little fear of assault.”56  In other 
words, Petlack suggested that Black civil liberties could only be enforced by restricting 
White civil liberties.  If they were not so enforced, white people would have infringed 
upon Black civil liberties.  Lincoln was willing to side with Black rights of course, but 
Davis was not, yet he remained fervently antislavery. 
Why then, did Davis oppose “political” abolitionists if he was in fact antislavery 
himself?  Many Whigs, like Davis, were against “political” abolitionists not because of 
their goal to rid the country of slavery but rather because of their advocacy of violence to 
do so.  This was a time in American history in which society on the prairie was changing 
and lawyers were the individuals making this change.  Lawyers and judges were seeking 
social order.  Therefore, Davis, as a man of the law, saw “political” abolitionist violence 
to be detrimental to law and social order that he and other jurists were attempting to 
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establish.  Nor did Davis agree with abolitionist ideology in regards to black political 
rights.  In a letter to Lincoln during the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Davis stated, “It is 
industriously circulated that you favor negro Equality.  All the orators should 
distinctively & emphatically disavow negro suffrage, negroes holding office, serving on 
juries & the like.”57  Lincoln famously took Davis’s advice at the Charleston debate and 
in a rather convoluted way, distanced himself from Black equality, a position that, 
according to James Oakes lasted only until the First Inaugural, where Lincoln came out 
for extending equal privileges and immunities to Blacks.58  Davis, on the other hand, held 
these prejudicial views for the rest of his life.  Still, when it came to ruling from the 
bench, Davis kept his views out of the decision-making process.  Even during his time as 
a Circuit Court Judge, Davis dismissed a case in 1854 for an African American woman 
who had been arrested for disturbing the peace.  She was released on her own 
recognizance.59            
In this context, we can then establish a political pedigree in which Davis’s 
opposition to Radical Republicans stemmed more from his resistance to abolitionism, 
rather than simply anti-Partyism.  This will become vital to understand later on when 
Radicals in Congress react to Milligan.  In their minds, Davis’s opinion jeopardized their 
ability to use military commissions to protect freedmen in a post-war South.  Yet, as we 
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have seen, he equally opposed extremist Democrats.  In 1863, Davis shared with his 
brother-in-law Julius Rockwell his disdain for Peace Democrats, just as he had opposed 
Locofocos in his early political career.  “The Democratic party in this State [Illinois] is in 
the hands of Extreme men just as the …Republican party of the U.S. is in the hands of the 
extreme Anti-Slavery men.”60  Only a month before, Davis had written to his wife Sarah, 
complaining of Peace Democrats, or Copperheads, publicly denouncing Lincoln as a 
“tyrant & despot” and “charging him with violating the Constitution and being a worse 
traitor than Jeff Davis.”61  Ironically, Milligan could be seen today as a Copperhead 
document in its chastisement of Lincoln and his extra-constitutional actions during the 
war.                              
The circumstances that resulted in the elevation of Davis to the Supreme Court 
had little to do with civil liberties but it is worth noting exactly how he did reach the 
highest court in the land.  When Lincoln took office in 1861, he was faced with filling 
three vacancies on the Supreme Court.  He was also faced with an impending national 
crisis.  He chose to deal with the latter first.  It was not until January 1862 that he turned 
his attention to the Court.  Presidential appointments to the Supreme Court worked 
differently in the 19th century, however.  At the time, President Lincoln was restricted by 
law requiring every associate justice to represent one of the nine judicial circuits.  Thus, 
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he had to fill the three vacancies with judges from the seventh, eighth, and ninth judicial 
circuits.62   
Even though Lincoln and Davis were very close friends and many thought 
Davis’s nomination was a fait accompli, Lincoln hesitated in nominating him.  Davis, 
himself, actually hoped that Lincoln would appoint him as a federal district court judge 
rather than a Supreme Court justice.  Illinois Senator Orville Browning was in the 
running for the Supreme Court and very much appealed to the president.  However, after 
being inundated with letters from friends and colleagues of both Lincoln and Davis, 
Lincoln finally made the decision to nominate Davis.  The president made the offer to 
Davis in the summer of 1862 while Congress was out of session.63   
Davis’s feelings on his own recess appointment were not very optimistic.  He 
doubted whether he could perform competently on the Supreme Court.  This is 
understandable given the fact that all of his experience had been at the trial court level 
and largely dealt with the common law, rather than constitutional issues.  He expressed 
his misgivings to a friend in January 1862.  “I often doubt whether I could sustain myself 
on the Supreme Bench.  It may be that I am not self-confident enough.  I certainly could 
not without hard study.  I have but little legal learning, and whether study would suit me 
now may be very doubtful.”64  It can be fairly stated that Judge Davis had no particular 
judicial agenda when he assumed the Supreme Court.  Yet, it was during his time as a 
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justice that he would emerge as a civil libertarian, drafting what many see as one of the 
greatest defenses of civil liberties in American jurisprudence.   
Despite his own doubts about his judicial potential, Davis was confirmed by the 
Senate on December 8, 1862 and took the bench two days later.65  Early on in his tenure 
as associate justice, he expressed his continued disdain for partisan politics.  “The labors 
of the Court are considerable, but I feel just now, as if I could get along with them, 
provided, I could keep out of politics & visitors would let me alone.”66    
Davis, though, intervened in cases involving civil liberties long before he ruled in 
Milligan.  It is in this sub-plot that Davis emerged as a civil libertarian.  Concerns about 
civil liberties issues had been raised very early in Lincoln’s presidency beginning with 
the 1861 suspension of habeas corpus that resulted in Ex parte Merryman.  In the days 
and months following Fort Sumter, Lincoln faced unprecedented events that required 
extraordinary actions.  At that point, seven southern states had already seceded from the 
Union.  On April 19, a mob in Baltimore obstructed Massachusetts troops from marching 
through the city, on their way to Washington.  When word came that a special session of 
the Maryland legislature had been called, Republicans feared that a secession ordinance 
would be adopted.  Lincoln held off on arresting the members of the Maryland legislature 
at first, but on April 27, he gave General Winfield Scott the following order: 
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the 
laws of the United States.  If at any point on or in the 
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vicinity of the military line, which is now used between the 
City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington, via 
Perryville, Annapolis City, and Annapolis Junction, you 
find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you, 
personally or through the officer in command at the point 
where the resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that 
writ.”67        
 
    
Nine members of the Maryland legislature were arrested before they could even have the 
opportunity to vote for or against secession.  In The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln 
and Civil Liberties, historian Mark Neely argues that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas 
corpus was not originally a political measure, nor would it become a political measure 
over the course of the war.  For Neely, Lincoln was simply responding to military threats: 
the blockage of military troop routes and a Democratic-controlled state legislature.  
Although Neely exonerated Lincoln of politically motivated wrong-doing, rogue 
military officers were also responsible for complicating civil liberties issues during the 
war.  On August 30, 1861, Major General John C. Frémont issued a proclamation stating 
that circumstances in Missouri required a state of martial law.  According to the 
proclamation, all persons within the prescribed military district found with weapons 
would be tried by court-martial.  Fearing that the border state of Missouri would secede, 
Lincoln immediately ordered Frémont to rescind the proclamation.68  Military 
commissions were convened throughout Missouri in order to hear cases involving the 
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destruction of railroads, railroad cars, and telegraph lines.  On January 1, 1862, Major 
General Henry W. Halleck, acting on his own authority, stated that the civilian courts in 
Missouri, “can give us no assistance as they are very generally unreliable.  There is no 
alternative but to enforce martial law.”69 To counteract many of these unauthorized 
military commissions, Lincoln reviewed the case proceedings and overturned them.  
However, these reviews were few and far between. He was much too preoccupied with 
the war in Virginia and thus in the words of Mark Neely, he “failed to act with sufficient 
decisiveness to meet Missouri’s extraordinary problems, and civil liberties in that state 
were severely restricted by local military commanders for months before the president 
did anything.”70    
When Lincoln first suspended habeas corpus, it was geographically limited.  
Later, on September 24, 1862, he suspended the writ nationwide, mainly in response to 
draft dodgers.  This second suspension encompassed “any person or persons who may be 
engaged, by act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any way 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United 
States” and “that such persons may be tried before a military commission.”71  Legal 
scholar Dan Farber noted, “Lincoln’s use of habeas in areas of insurrection or actual war 
should be considered constitutionally appropriate, at least in the absence of any contrary 
action by Congress.  But even after Congress authorized suspending habeas corpus, as we 
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will see, the use of military law in the North sometimes went beyond constitutional 
limits.”72              
For nearly two years, Congress remained on the sidelines but on March 3, 1863, 
Congress took Lincoln’s side and passed the Habeas Corpus Act.  In order to resolve 
jurisdictional problems like those posed in Merryman and later Milligan, Congress 
established that “during the present rebellion, the President of the United States, 
whenever in his judgement the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part 
thereof.”73  However, Congress did take care to provide some relief to those arrested 
under the suspension.  The act provided that the Secretary of War was required to present 
a list of all prisoners to the civil courts.  If a grand jury met without indicting said 
prisoners, those prisoners were to be immediately released from custody on the condition 
of taking a loyalty oath.74  Lincoln resisted using the act, believing that he did not need it. 
In May of 1863, when a group of New York Democrats criticized him for violating civil 
liberties, Lincoln via the Corning Letter, did not even reference the act to justify his 
actions.75 Yet, in September, when he suspended the writ again, Lincoln’s order began by 
referring to both the Constitution and the act and ends by urging all citizens "to conduct 
and govern themselves ... in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and the 
                                                          
72 Dan Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 163.   
73 An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, U.S. 
Statutes at Large 755 (1863).   
74 Ibid.   
75 James A. Dueholm, “Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: An Historical & 
Constitutional Analysis,” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 29, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 48.   
  
36 
 
laws of Congress.”76  Here it appears that he was prepared to assert Constitutional and 
Congressional authority to suspend the writ.  
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, though, did not explicitly prohibit military 
commissions.  Commissions would therefore continue to be the primary judicial 
instrument for the duration of the war and largely remain unregulated by either the 
legislative or sometimes even the executive branch.  Lincoln’s task as President during 
the war was so vast that he was forced to delegate power to state and local officials.  The 
governor of Indiana and the military commanders appointed there by the War Department 
were given broad authority to quell Copperhead dissent, which in turn led to the military 
trial of Milligan and his co-defendants.   
It appears Davis first began to show concerns about the direction of the Lincoln 
administration was taking on Northern civil liberties issues in the winter of 1862.  In 
November 1862, Davis brought with him a letter from Judge Samuel Treat of St. Louis, 
who had issued a writ of habeas corpus for a civilian which the military had refused to 
acknowledge.  Like Davis, Treat was a close personal friend of Lincoln’s and his chess 
partner in Springfield.77  Lincoln had pled over 1,200 cases before Judge Treat at both the 
trial and appeals level.  In his letter to Davis, Judge Treat advised Lincoln to act within 
the Constitution so as to increase support in the Border State of Missouri.  He also 
suggested that the President send the entire western army to secure the Mississippi.78  In 
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response, Lincoln wrote Treat stating that “the country will not allow us to send our 
whole Western force down the Mississippi, while the enemy sacks Louisville and 
Cincinnati.”79  While Lincoln did not even mention the habeas corpus issue in his 
response to Treat, the fact that Davis presented Treat’s letter to him strongly suggests he 
was concerned about civil liberties five weeks before he took his seat on the Supreme 
Court.    
Thus was the Northern civil liberties landscape that Davis faced during the first 
two years of the war.  It is also important to note that he supported Lincoln’s war-time 
actions in the South.  In the Prize Cases, Davis along with Grier, Wayne, Swayne, and 
Miller upheld Lincoln’s naval blockade of the South.80  This case confirmed the 
legitimacy of treating the Confederacy as a belligerent under the laws of war which in 
turn justified the sweeping use of the commander-in-chief clause, among other things, to 
confiscate Confederate property, including the emancipation of slaves, and to use military 
commissions.      
Davis did, however, take exception to one Southern war measure: the 
Emancipation Proclamation.  This makes sense in light of Davis’s own racial prejudices.  
                                                          
79 Abraham Lincoln to Samuel Treat, November 19, 1862, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 
Roy Basles, ed. Vol. 5 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 501.  Louisville served as 
the main hub for planning, supplies, recruiting, and transportation for the Western Theatre of the war. 
Stephen I. Rockenbach, “A Border City at War: Lousiville & the 1862 Invasion of Kentucky” Ohio Valley 
History 3, no. 4 (Winter 2003):35-52.  In July 1862, Confederate General Braxton Bragg launched an 
invasion of Kentucky. His objective was to sever Union supply routes on the Ohio River via the Louisville 
& Portland Canal.  Cincinnati served as a center of supplies and troops for the Union Army and was the 
Headquarters for the Department of the Ohio.  In September 1862, Confederate General Henry Heth 
marched on the city.  Upon facing strong Federal lines, he decided not to attack. Gail Stephens, “This City 
Must Not Be Taken,” Traces of Indiana & Midwestern History 22, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 4–17.        
80 The Brig Amy Warwick, The Schooner Crenshaw, The Barque Hiawatha, and The Schooner 
Brilliante, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).   
  
38 
 
On one occasion, he told Lincoln that issuing the proclamation would be counter-
productive to the war.  Nothing is said about a meeting with Lincoln in the Davis papers 
on this issue, but according to Orville H. Browning, a friend of both Davis and Lincoln, 
“Judge Davis…told me that he had a conversation with the President yesterday and urged 
upon him to change his policy, as the only means of saving the Country.” In response, 
Lincoln stated, “his proclamation in regards to slavery was a fixed thing.”81  Six months 
later, in a letter to his brother-in-law Julius Rockwell, Davis blamed Lincoln’s 
proclamation for the Border States’ discontent with the war.  “In the Western Country 
until the Emancipation Proclamation, the people were united in the support of the War-
Now, they are divided.”82  Other than this particular issue, Davis consistently upheld 
Lincoln’s war-time actions when it came to the southern states in rebellion.  His actions 
in the North, however, concerned Davis greatly.               
Soon thereafter, in the spring of 1863, Davis intervened with Lincoln again in a 
civil liberties issue.  In March of that year, Wilber F. Storey, editor of the Chicago Times, 
began publishing editorials vehemently criticizing the Lincoln administration and 
encouraging Northerners to protest its war policies, especially the Emancipation 
Proclamation. The Times frequently ran supposed letters from soldiers, voicing their 
opposition to abolitionism.  Storey brought to the newspaper a seething hatred for blacks 
and abolitionists that he extended to the Republican Party and the Lincoln administration 
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as well.  On March 17, Storey called for “a united, bold, vigorous, unyielding opposition 
to the prosecution of the war.”83  In response, General Ambrose Burnside, Commander of 
the Department of Ohio, finally ordered the Times shut down on June 1.  Public outrage 
was immediately felt in response to Burnside’s action.  Several politicians pleaded with 
Lincoln to rescind Burnside’s order.  David Davis and William Herndon, Lincoln’s old 
law partner from Springfield, sent Lincoln a telegram stating, “We deem it of the highest 
importance that you revoke the order ... suppressing the Chicago Times.”84   
In “To Suppress or Not to Suppress: Abraham Lincoln and the Chicago Times,” 
Craig D. Tenney suggests that it was Davis and Herndon’s telegram that convinced 
Lincoln to rescind Burnside’s order.  “It would appear from…the Davis-Herndon 
telegram that Lincoln…had already felt what to him would be rather weighty political 
pressure to negate Burnside’s action against the Times.”85  On June 4, Lincoln wrote to 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton ordering him to rescind the suppression of Storey’s 
newspaper.  “I have received additional dispatches which with former ones [the Davis-
Herndon message] induce me to believe we should revoke or suspend the order 
suspending the Chicago Times, and if you concur in [this] opinion, please have it 
done.”86  No correspondence exists that emphatically states that it was Davis and 
Herndon’s letter that finally convinced Lincoln but Davis continued to voice his concerns 
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about civil liberties issues as the war progressed.  During this time and in the context of 
the Civil War, Davis evolved into a civil libertarian.       
Storey’s situation also closely relates to the issues in Milligan.  As we will see, 
Lambdin P. Milligan was convicted not on evidence relating to a conspiracy to overthrow 
the government, but rather on one single published speech in which he criticized the 
Northern war effort.  No doubt, this intervention by Davis reflected his growing concern 
with government actions he felt to be constitutionally questionable.  In addition to 
shutting down newspapers, silencing speech, and suspending habeas corpus, Davis also 
began to intervene on behalf of Copperheads who faced trial by military commissions.      
In May 1863, while sitting as circuit judge in Indianapolis, Davis wrote to a 
Grand Jury:  
Gentlemen of the Grand Jury: We meet in a time of great 
national peril-in the midst of a war, unexampled for its 
wickedness and magnitude.  Our own honor-the treasure 
that has been spent-the blood that has been shed-the 
memories of the past, and the hopes of the future demand 
that this rebellion shall be crushed, the union of these States 
restored, and the authority of law recognized.  We may, and 
will differ, in any great war, on the right manner of 
conducting it, and the wisdom of the policy pursued, but no 
man, who is not a traitor at heart, will ever suffer that 
difference to lead him by speech or writing of counsel 
resistance to law.  It is charged that there are secret 
organizations with ‘grips, signs, and passwords’ having for 
their objects-resistance to Law, and the overthrow of the 
Government.  If anywhere in this State bad men have 
combined together for such wicked purposes, I pray you, 
bring them to light and let them receive the punishment due 
to their crime.87   
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The jury asked for a copy of the judge’s charge so they could publish it in the 
Indianapolis Journal.  Here, Davis again supported the war and punishing those who 
obstructed its progress, but at the same time insisted that the law be respected.  Once 
more, this illustrates Davis’s later intention of only applying Milligan’s holding to 
military commissions in the North.   
At the same time Davis was holding court in Indianapolis, Clement L. 
Vallandigham was being tried by a military commission in Ohio for making a speech 
against the war effort.  When his case reached the Supreme Court, Vallandigham’s 
petition was denied.  The Court reasoned that: 
The appellate powers of the Supreme Court, as granted by 
the Constitution, are limited and regulated by the acts of 
Congress, and must be exercised subject to the exceptions 
and regulations made by Congress. In other words, the 
petition before us we think not to be within the letter or 
spirit of the grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court. It is not in law or equity within the meaning of those 
terms as used in the 3d article of the Constitution. Nor is a 
military commission a court within the meaning of the 14th 
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. [Power of the 
Supreme Court to grant writs of habeas corpus] Nor can it 
be said that the authority to be exercised by a military 
commission is judicial in that sense. It involves discretion 
to examine, to decide and sentence, but there is no original 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus to review or reverse its proceedings, or the writ of 
certiorari to revise the proceedings of a military 
commission.88           
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It is important to note that while the Court did not accept Vallandigham’s case based on a 
technical jurisdiction matter, they rejected the ideas that military commissions were 
judicial bodies.  According to Davis’s biographer, Willard King, Justice Davis later stated 
in private that Vallandigham’s trial by military commission had been wrong.89  However, 
King’s citation for this alleged comment by Davis came from William Herndon and Jesse 
Weik’s Herndon’s Lincoln.  In cross checking this citation, Herndon’s book does not 
make mention of Davis stating that he thought Vallandigham’s military commission was 
wrong.  It appears that King miscited Herndon or perhaps misread him.  Additionally, no 
other primary source indicates that Davis ever made such a statement, but one could 
adduce from his concern over civil liberties especially military commissions, that he 
could have done so.         
Violent riots in the North began to grow in resistance to the Enrollment Act of 
1863.  In March, Brigadier General Henry B. Carrington was appointed to the District of 
Indiana and worked closely with Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton to organize and train 
troops to suppress uprisings.  He also developed a very intricate espionage network that 
kept Morton and Lincoln informed of Copperhead activity in Indiana.  This close 
working relationship became tenuous however when General Ambrose E. Burnside was 
put in command of the Department of Ohio, of which Indiana was a part.  On April 13, 
1863, Burnside issued General Orders No. 38, prescribing strict military punishment for 
any person who opposed the federal government and sympathized with the Confederacy.  
                                                          
89 King, Lincoln’s Manger, 254.  
  
43 
 
Morton was infuriated over Burnside’s action.  He was afraid that this extreme order 
would just fuel more resistance to the government.  Yet, Morton remained publically 
silent, that is until his right-hand man General Carrington was fired by Burnside.  General 
Milo S. Hascall, Carrington’s replacement, immediately began to arrest Democratic 
newspaper editors and destroy their presses.  Morton went from infuriated to seething.  
Hascall’s actions did not eliminate Peace Democratic (Copperhead) opposition however; 
it only strengthened the anti-war sentiment in Indiana.90                     
In response, Morton embarked on a crusade to have both Burnside and Hascall 
removed from command.  In doing so, he turned to Justice David Davis for help.  Davis 
personally telegraphed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, stating, “I have been for several 
weeks, and am, perfectly satisfied that the immediate removal of General Hascall is 
demanded by the honor and interests of the Government.”91  Over the next month, 
Morton made several trips to Washington City to press Lincoln to remove Burnside and 
Hascall.  Burnside remained in command but Stanton finally relieved Hascall in June.  It 
would be inaccurate to view Morton as a defender of Indiana’s freedom of the press and 
speech however.  As we will see in the case of Lamdin P. Milligan, Governor Morton 
would go on to arrest Copperhead editors and speakers himself.92           
  Davis was of course not the only one who was becoming concerned about civil 
liberties issues.  It is therefore important to briefly delve into the range of opinions on 
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civil liberties during the war.  Democrats, especially Copperheads, obviously made these 
concerns one of their primary causes.  An 1864 Indiana case involving selling liquor to 
soldiers, prefigured David Davis’ decision in Ex parte Milligan.  On June 8, 1863, the 
chief provost marshal of the military District of Indiana ordered Indianapolis provost 
marshal Captain Frank Wilcox to prohibit the sale of liquor to enlisted soldiers.  Joseph 
Griffin was subsequently arrested for violating the order.  He sued Wilcox for false 
imprisonment.  After losing his case in the Marion County Common Pleas Court, Griffin 
appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court.  Peace Democrat Judge Samuel E. Perkins 
delivered a scathing opinion on military arrests of civilians.   
Perkins’ concern was not whether Lincoln could arrest and hold civilians 
indefinitely by suspending habeas corpus, but rather applying military law to civilians.  
He noted that the suspension of habeas corpus did not legalize a wrongful arrest; it 
simply prohibited the prisoner his right to challenge his detention.  While he did not 
address whether Congress could enact martial law, Perkins did define the conditions for 
martial law.  “Martial law is exercised in our country, the military being on the spot to 
execute it, where no civil authority exists.  But where the civil authority exists, the 
Constitution is imperative that it shall be paramount to the military.”93  Perkins’ opinion 
would slightly mirror Davis’s opinion two years later in Ex parte Milligan.  We cannot 
know for certain but it may be that Davis adopted Perkins’ opinion when he drafted 
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Milligan, for they both recognized the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution in times of war 
and peace and that martial law can only be implemented in areas of actual hostilities.    
It is also important to note that Justice Perkins was fundamentally at odds with 
Republicans about civil liberties.  We already know Lincoln’s position: the constitution 
provided him with vast war powers, especially in the face of rebellion.  In his famous 
“Corning letter” Lincoln explains, “Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who 
deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert? I 
think that in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only 
constitutional, but, with all, a great mercy.”94  Lincoln felt that Copperheads posed a real 
threat in the form of diminishing the ranks.  Rather than diminish the ranks himself by 
executing deserters, Lincoln felt it necessary to eliminate the source of desertion.  Davis 
understood the threat of Peace Democrats as well, but he, unlike Lincoln, never believed 
that civil liberties in the North should be sacrificed in the interest of prosecuting the war 
in the South.  While it is mere speculation, given Davis’s logic, he might have supported 
shooting the simple-minded soldier boy rather than arrest the wiley agitator and risk 
violating his constitutional right to a civilian trial.        
Harvard Law professor and War Democrat Joel Parker, on the other hand, came to 
the defense of Lincoln’s actions regarding civil liberties.  He argued that habeas corpus 
was not the same in war and peace.  Even though civilian control of the military was 
defined in the constitution, it could not be applied to camps or battlefields.  Civil law 
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simply could not be used in these places.  Therefore, martial law naturally existed during 
wartime by virtue of the laws of war.  For Parker, it all came down to a matter of 
practicality.  He pointed out the harmful and dangerous result of allowing the halt of the 
military but civil courts.95  Henry Stanbery, attorney for the government in Milligan, 
would make a similar argument in defense of that particular military commission.         
Likewise, Republican attorney and Congressman from Pennsylvania, Horace 
Binney, offered a defense of Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. In his 1862 
pamphlet, The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution, Binney 
avoided using circumstantial arguments based on the desperate times of the Civil War.  
Nor did he plea morality or politics in supporting Lincoln’s actions.  He stated:  
The power to suspend the privilege of the Writ, is moreover 
inseparably connected with rebellion or invasion, — with 
internal war. The direction of such a war is necessarily 
Avith the Executive. The office cannot be deprived of it. It 
is the duty of the office, in both its military and civil 
aspects, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion. The 
power to suspend the privilege, is supplementary to the 
military power to suppress or repel.96  
 
For Binney then, the crux of when to suspend the writ lay with conditions-invasion or 
rebellion.  He argued that those were not same conditions as “war”, which Congress 
possessed sole authority to declare.  Instead, invasion and rebellion were factual 
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conditions to be identified and dealt with immediately, whether Congress was in session 
or not.  Logically then, the power to suspend habeas corpus fell to the president.           
For his part, Justice Davis made clear to Lincoln his position on military 
commissions, as they became an emerging civil liberties issue.  Writing to William 
Herndon, Lincoln’s former law partner, in September 1866, Davis reflected: 
Mr. Lincoln was advised and I so advised him, that the various 
military trials in the Northern and Border States, where the 
Courts were free and untrammeled, were unconstitutional and 
wrong; that they should not and ought not to be sustained by the 
Supreme Court; that such proceedings were dangerous to 
liberty.97 
 
Notice that Davis narrowed his opposition to military commission to the North and 
Border States.  He said nothing about military commissions in the South.   
Not only did Davis advise the President against the use of military commissions 
in the North and Border States, he also directly intervened on behalf of civilian 
defendants who were put on trial before military commissions.  On March 28, 1864, in 
Charleston, Illinois, mounting hostility between Coles County Peace Democrats and 
Union soldiers on leave finally came to a head.  These soldiers had long resented Peace 
Democrats for criticizing a war in which they themselves had fought and sacrificed so 
much for.  Encouraging draft dodging, too, infuriated Union soldiers.  This animosity 
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boiled over into a riot in late March which left six soldiers and three civilians killed and 
twelve wounded.  To be sure, it was one of the bloodiest riots in the North.  Over the next 
several days, fifty citizens were arrested and about one hundred depositions were taken 
from other Coles County residents.  In the end, sixteen prisoners were incarcerated at 
Camp Yates in Springfield.  One prisoner died while in custody.98       
In June, a Coles County grand jury returned fourteen indictments against 
Copperheads for murder and riot.  However, only two were indicted for murder and two 
were indicted for rioting.  The other prisoners had escaped and fled the area.  The legal 
prosecution, however, followed two paths.  The military, based on a recommendation 
from Judge Advocate General Henry Burnett, a military commission was appointed to try 
the prisoners in Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 21, 1864.  Meanwhile, Attorneys Orlando B. 
Ficklin and Milton Hay were working feverously to get the unindicted prisoners released 
and the indicted prisoners handed over to civil authorities.  On June 22, Ficklin and Hay 
requested a writ of habeas corpus from the Fourth Circuit Court, where Judge Samuel H. 
Treat was presiding alongside David Davis who was on the circuit.99 
Treat and Davis granted the writ which was then given to Colonel James Oakes, 
commandant of Camp Yates, with instructions to release the prisoners and deliver them 
to Springfield.  However, Oakes had just been ordered by his superiors to deliver the men 
to Cincinnati for military trial.  The next day Oakes was informed by his commanding 
officer that President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus in the Coles County 
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prisoner’s case.  Judge Davis was in St. Louis when this transpired, but Judge Treat, 
honoring the President’s suspension, dismissed the case.  When Davis learned about the 
suspension, he expressed his displeasure in a letter to Lincoln on July 1, 1864, stating:  
The govt (sic) I think must have acted on the wrong 
information.  If I could get the necessary correct 
information concerning the matter either for bringing it to 
the President myself or do it in confirmation with Judge 
Treat, as might be deemed most advisable.100   
At this point in the exchange of correspondence, Davis did not provide an explanation as 
to what he meant by “wrong information” but this incident again illustrates his increasing 
concern for Lincoln’s actions regarding civil liberties.   
Not knowing that Davis had sent this letter, Lincoln wrote Treat the following day 
requesting that he and Davis send him their analysis of the case.  In response, Judge Treat 
sent Lincoln a telegram on July 4 stating:  
The record in the case of the Coles Co prisoners was 
ordered to be certified to the president it contains the whole 
case in my opinion the prisoners should have 
been surrendered to the civil authority under the act of 
March Third (3) eighteen sixty three (1863) Judge Davis 
was of the same opinion.101  
 
                                                          
100  Davis to Lincoln, July 1, 1864, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main 
Series), 1861-1870 (M619), roll 285, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.   
101 Treat to Lincoln, July 4, 1864, The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. 
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mal:1:./temp/~ammem_USlD. 
  
50 
 
On the same day, Davis wrote a four-page letter to Lincoln summarizing the 
evidence and providing his reasoning and statutory law for the release of the prisoners.  
Davis adamantly stated:  
The Govt. (sic) ought not to have taken these men out of 
the hand of the law.  Besides the disregard of the law as I 
think, it will irritate the public mind and cannot possibly do 
any good.  A Grand Jury of Coles Co. has patiently 
investigated the outrage at Charleston and found several 
indictments for murder and riot.102 
   
Here, it seems that Davis was trying to convince Lincoln that the local civilian court had 
competently performed its duty by issuing the indictments.  Therefore, a military trial 
was not necessary.  David continued with his reasoning by stating: 
The guilty should be punished.  Both certainty and severity 
of punishment are demanded, where it can be measured out 
if I understand the case a right only in a state court.  These 
prisoners violated no law of the United States.  There was 
no attempt to arrest a deserter.  The fight was brought on 
purposely by bad men who were not in the military service.  
How can they be tried by military law?  They violated no 
military law.103 
 
 Davis did not question whether the prisoners should have been punished.  His only 
concern was that they were tried in the proper civilian court system, as they were 
civilians themselves and not under the authority of the military.  Davis concluded his 
opinion to Lincoln by referencing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863: 
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But even if they had violated a law of the United States, it 
was the duty of the govt. after they were arrested to have 
had them prosecuted at the first term of the court.  Court 
adjourned and no proceeding was had against them & as far 
as the United States were concerned, they were entitled to 
their discharge.  The Secretary of War furnished no list of 
the prisoners to the judges which should have been done, 
and the Grand Jury adjourned.104       
 
It is interesting to note that Davis did not appeal to the prisoner’s civil liberties via the 
Bill of Rights.  This particular intervention is solely based upon constitutional and 
statutory law.  Milligan though, would be the turning point for constitutional liberalism 
and the supremacy of the Bill of Rights over military law and the laws of nations.  Davis 
was successful in his intervention for the Coles Co. Peace Democrats.  Finally, on 
November 4, 1864, Lincoln ordered the release of the prisoners.   
Even though Davis was concerned about the mass uprising of Peace Democrats, 
he was not willing to sacrifice their civil liberties in the interest of stamping out dissent.   
This attention to the rule of law would be carried on into his majority opinion in Milligan.  
A law and order Whig early in life, Davis became concerned with civil liberties issues, 
specifically military commissions, over the course of the American Civil War.  It is clear 
that Davis strongly criticized Lincoln’s actions despite their close friendship.  He would 
also take Lincoln to task after he was assassinated in Milligan.  Davis was not afraid to 
express his concerns and objections to civil liberties issues in the North from a non-
partisan, constitutional standpoint.  While he strongly opposed extremist political groups, 
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like the Copperheads, he nevertheless stood up for their civil liberties.  After directly 
intervening in free speech, habeas corpus, and military commission cases while on the 
Supreme Court, Davis would soon have another opportunity to place his imprimatur for 
the defense of civil law over military law.  Alongside eight other justices, in the winter of 
1865, he would hear arguments in Ex parte Milligan that sowed the seeds for not only 
one of the greatest defenses of American civil liberties, but also the worsening of 
Reconstruction partisan politics.  But first, we must look back to how Lamdin P. 
Milligan’s case came to the attention of Judge David Davis to begin with.                 
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CHAPTER III 
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION: THE INDIANAPOLIS TREASON TRIAL                
AND EX PARTE MILLIGAN   
 
 
It should be noted from the outset that no testimony or direct evidence was 
introduced that linked Milligan to the plot in Chicago or that he was at any meeting in 
which the plot was discussed.  Witnesses simply stated that he had been to several 
organizational meetings with the other defendants and had accepted the rank of Major-
General as a member of the Sons of Liberty.105  Testimony did suggest that this 
organization was, in fact, a clandestine, para-military arm of the Democratic Party.  One 
witness stated that the purpose of the Sons of Liberty was to uphold Democratic 
principles and strengthen the party, while another stated that members were required to 
be Democrats.  In in his majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan David Davis would later 
object to several elements of the Military Commission.  Understanding these aspects of 
the military trial will allow us to better understand why Davis ruled the way he did and 
why the Radical Republicans viewed his decision adversely.   
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Born on March 24, 1812 in Belmont, Ohio, Lamdin Purdy Milligan came of age 
during the nullification crisis of 1832-1833.106  This would have a significant impact on 
his political leanings.  In February 1834, at age twenty-one, Milligan served as secretary 
for the “Original Jacksonians” in St. Clairsville, Ohio.  The group subscribed themselves 
to the “Jeffersonian school of ’98 and ’99 (the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 
1798 and 1799-two documents upholding states’ rights).  Early on, Milligan fully 
supported Jackson’s defense of states’ rights but then took a less supportive attitude 
towards him after Jackson’s 1833 “Force Bill”, a piece of legislation that would have 
given the president power to enforce federal authority in South Carolina.  
Notwithstanding, Milligan remained loyal to Jackson while blaming his decisions on bad 
advisors. 107  Milligan’s desire and training to be an attorney is unclear but we do know 
that on October 27, 1835 he passed the Ohio bar examination.  He was among a group of 
nine new lawyers that day, one of which included Edwin M. Stanton.108  In April 1838, 
Milligan was selected as a county delegate to the Democratic Convention where he spoke 
out against banks and supported the South’s constitutional right to slavery.109  In the fall 
of 1845, Milligan moved to Huntington County, Indiana where he repeatedly failed in 
various elections as a Democrat.  By this time, he had established himself as a proslavery, 
Northern Democrat sympathizer of the South.  In 1848, Milligan sought the nomination 
for state senator but lost and in 1850 sought the nomination for state representative but 
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lost again.  For the next eight years he returned to the full-time practice of law before he 
was elected Huntington Township Trustee in 1858.110  In 1860, he again attempted higher 
office when he sought the nomination for attorney general but lost once more.  With 
public office continuing to evade him, Milligan decided to put his political energies 
toward another Democrat.  He vigorously campaigned for Stephen Douglas but after the 
election Milligan took a strong-pro secession stance.111             
From its very outset, Milligan vehemently opposed the war and made it his life’s 
work to do everything he could to protect the Constitution’s “first principles”: the 
constitutionality of slavery and the rights of nullification and secession.  Shortly after the 
attack on Fort Sumter, one local Huntington County resident noted, “Mr. Milligan even 
went so far as to say that he would rather spit upon the stars and stripes than to see them 
at the head of an army marching.”112  Even his own neighbors questioned his loyalty.      
Milligan began to make a name for himself among Peace Democrats, or Copperheads, 
accepting invitations to speak across northern Indiana and giving speeches to large and 
eager audiences while passionately declaring his message of resistance to the draft, the 
Emancipation Proclamation, and Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus.  He was even so 
bold as to urge the Northwest to secede from the Union and ally itself with the 
Confederacy.  By the end of the summer, Republican governors of Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois were increasingly concerned about the growing threats of insurrection by 
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Milligan and other like-minded Copperheads.  From the very start of the war many 
Southerners hoped that a series of victories would sow a seed of defeatism among 
Northwestern states such as Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, leading to their desertion of 
the Union war cause.  Many Northern Copperheads strongly believed in this possibility 
and laid plans to formulate a “Northwestern Confederacy.”113  
In Indiana’s 1862 congressional elections, Democratic candidates seized onto the 
public resentment of the Lincoln administration’s actions regarding the Emancipation 
Proclamation, military arrests, and suppression of the Democratic press.  Indiana 
Democrats took back control of both chambers of the General Assembly.  When the new 
General Assembly opened in January 1863, the Democrats vowed to remove Indiana’s 
Republican governor, Oliver P. Morton from office.114  Indiana Republicans of course 
resisted Democratic attempts at seizing the governor’s wartime powers.  By bolting from 
the statehouse, Republicans denied Democrats a quorum.  This successfully sidelined the 
Copperheads and negated their electoral victory, but it also meant there could be no 
constitutional state budget.  Instead of recalling the legislature to fund the state, Governor 
Morton received funds from the War Department, Republican county governments, and 
private bankers in New York.  In effect, Morton illegally ran the State of Indiana without 
the Democrats, leading to even more Copperhead disaffection.115   
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Past scholarship on Copperheadism has downplayed the threat of this group, 
particularly Richard O. Curry and Frank L. Klement who argued that perceived 
Copperhead anti-war activity was simply a product of Republican propaganda used to 
snuff out political dissent. 116  Mark Neely, in The Fate of Liberty, argued that the 
Copperhead threat was exaggerated.117  However, in 2006, Jennifer Weber’s book 
Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North showed that 
Northern anti-war sentiment was so strong that Peace Democrats almost took control of 
the entire party in 1864.  She also pointed out that the Copperheads were very effective in 
undermining Northern military manpower and that in response Lincoln had to divert 
troops to New York to quell the anti-draft rioters in 1863.118  Archivist Stephen Towne’s 
2015 book, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate Conspiracies 
in America’s Heartland, is the most comprehensive study of Copperheadism to date.  
Steeped in archival material, this book echoes Weber, in that there was, in fact, an actual 
and present Copperhead threat in the state of Indiana during the Civil War.  Through the 
lens of U.S. Army intelligence operations, Towne uncovers plot after plot, aimed at not 
only disrupting Lincoln’s war effort but bringing the war to an end.119   
                                                          
116 See Richard O. Curry, "Copperheadism and Continuity: the Anatomy of a Stereotype," Journal 
of Negro History 57, no. 1 (January 1972): 29-36, Frank L. Klement, Copperheads in the Middle West 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), and Frank L. Klement, Dark Lanterns: Secret Political 
Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Press University, 
1989).   
117 Neely, Fate of Liberty, 64.  
118 See Jennifer L. Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
119 See Stephen E. Towne, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate 
Conspiracies in America’s Heartland (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015).  
  
58 
 
Weber and Towne’s assessments of Copperheads as a real and serious threat to 
the Northern war effort echoed nineteenth century Republican opinion.  On July 12, 1864  
James A. Sheahan, of the Chicago Post, wrote  
All people will recollect [that the Northwestern 
Confederacy] was a common topic of conversation in the 
spring of 1862 among ‘Northern men of Southern 
principles,’ who scouted the idea that Grant would take 
Vicksburg as they are now pooh-poohing the idea that he 
will take Richmond.  In all the larger cities of the 
Northwest, and in many of the smaller ones, these 
Northwestern Confederacy disunionists were bold in 
avowing and vociferous in advocating the traitorous 
scheme.120  
 
What exactly was this traitorous scheme?  According to federal agents, Lambdin P. 
Milligan, and other Copperheads like him, planned to overthrow state governments by 
stealing a cache of army issue arms and liberating several prisoner-of-war camps, starting 
with Camp Douglas in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention in August 
1864.  Milligan and his co-defendants were all members of the Sons of Liberty, a 
clandestine Copperhead organization, led by Clement L. Vallandigham, dedicated to 
helping the South win the war by carrying out paramilitary operations.  Testimony at 
Milligan’s trial further suggested that the organization was also in communication with 
Richmond, which sent agents from Canada with money to pay certain designated 
Copperhead leaders to formulate uprisings.121  To be sure, the testimony that was offered 
during the Military Commission was dubious at best.  Witnesses provided vague and 
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conflicting accounts of the times and locations of numerous Sons of Liberty meetings and 
the issues discussed at those meetings.  A large portion of the trial consisted of character 
testimony, delving into the trustworthiness and patriotism of the defendants rather than 
actual evidence that would pin them to an actual conspiracy.         
In addition to opposing emancipation and black equality, Copperheads saw 
themselves as the political descendants of Jackson and Jefferson, who both at least 
rhetorically supported limited government.  Like Jackson and Jefferson, Copperheads 
grounded themselves in a relatively libertarian-sounding variant of republicanism, fearing 
tyranny and usurpation from the Federal Government, and upholding a “strict 
construction” of the Constitution.  It is understandable that their rhetoric concerning 
government power and the Constitution harkened back to the Anti-Federalists and 
Jefferson’s subsequent conflict with Hamilton.  Of course, along with their political 
convictions, Copperheads, or Peace Democrats, simply wanted the war to be over and 
Blacks to remain enslaved in the South.  While they were generally sympathetic toward 
the South, they envisioned a united country, not a divided one. Together with their 
political roots and wartime goals, their slogan became, “The Constitution as it is, the 
Union as it was, and the nigger where he belongs.”122   
Additionally, Copperheads can be generally considered the militant wing of the 
Peace Democrats, but among Republicans that line was somewhat vague. In Indiana, the 
Johnson County Republicans declared that “in the present calamities of our government, 
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we recognize no party line but that drawn between loyalty and disloyalty-between those 
who sustain the government and those who oppose it.”123  Despite the Peace Democrats’ 
insistence that they remained loyal to the Union even though they did not support the war 
policies of President Lincoln, Republicans refused to distinguish them from Copperheads.  
In fact, Democratic leaders, in the spring of 1863, realized the party was unprepared for 
the large-scale political violence many Copperheads were encouraging.   However, as 
historian Robert H. Churchill points out, Indiana Republican public speeches and private 
letters began to use “Democrat and Copperhead” interchangeably.  Joining Klement, 
Churchill concludes that this mindset produced violence toward non-Copperhead Peace 
Democrats that many times bordered on the ridiculous.  In Sullivan County, Indiana, 
Republicans assaulted a female member during church, held her down, and forcibly 
stripped her of a butternut pin (a badge symbolizing Southern heritage of many 
Democrats, not necessarily Copperheads).124                  
Jennifer Weber identifies three distinct phases in the Copperhead’s development.  
The first phase began during the secession crisis. While some Copperheads supported the 
Confederacy, this was just a minority view.  Many opposed the war but thought secession 
was legal as the Constitution did not expressly forbid it.  What really upset them were 
Lincoln’s actions in response to secession.  As noted earlier, these Peace Democrats held 
extremely racists views, even more so than most nineteenth-century Americans.  The 
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second phase, therefore, began when Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation. 
Copperheads were livid.  They already blamed Abolitionist for the war, but now they 
really feared what freedmen would do to northern jobs, not to mention the virtue of 
northern women.  The third phase began in 1864, the lowest point for the Lincoln 
administration.  By the summer, Union armies had all but stopped on all fronts and the 
death toll seemed to grow by the day.  Northerners who were previously supportive of the 
war began to demand an end to the slaughter.  For a brief time, Copperheads enjoyed a 
spike in their ranks but as Grant started to push forward again with victories, those new 
peace recruits ran back to Lincoln’s corner.125   
By August 1864, the arrival of troops from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton 
forestalled the Sons of Liberty plot to liberate Confederate prisoners held at Camp 
Douglas.  Federal agents had been watching these kinds of secret societies since 1861 and 
in 1864 they started to close in on the Knights of the Golden Circle.  The members 
quickly disbanded and reorganized themselves into the Sons of Liberty.  Unfortunately 
for them, by late summer 1864, federal agents had once again infiltrated their ranks and 
discovered the Chicago plot along with those involved.  In the meantime, through 
undercover agents in Canada, arms and ammunition were found at Harrison Dodd’s 
printing office along with correspondence from Milligan.126   
Based on reports from federal agents, on October 5, 1864, Lambdin P. Milligan, 
along with co-conspirators Harrison H. Dodd, Horace Heffren, William A. Bowles, 
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Stephen Horsey, and Andrew Humphrey were arrested for conspiracy to incite 
insurrection and disloyal practices in the state of Indiana.  Commander of the District of 
Indiana, General Henry B. Carrington, wanted the defendants tried in a civilian court but 
Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wanted to use a 
more expedient method by trying the men before a military commission.  Unfortunately 
for the government, before the trial was even convened, Dodd escaped into Canada.  He 
was tried and found guilty in absentia by the Military Commission.127  Between October 
21 and December 6, Milligan, Heffren, Bowles, Horsey, and Humphrey were tried before 
a military commission in Indianapolis on charges of “conspiracy against the government 
of the United States, affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the 
United States, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation of the laws of war.”  
The specific charge for the violation of the laws of war “consisted of an attempt, through 
a secret organization, to give aid and comfort to rebels.”128  This was, of course, in 
reference to their plan to liberate the prisoner of war camp and arm Confederate 
soldiers.129   
This conspiracy was first formulated in the summer of 1864.  According to 
testimony, the plan was to seize the federal arsenals in Columbus, Ohio, Indianapolis, 
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Indiana, and Chicago, Alton, and Rock Island, Illinois and free Confederate soldiers 
imprisoned in those states.  The Confederate soldiers, alongside groups of Copperheads, 
would then overthrow each of these states’ governments and establish provisional 
governments.  The starting point of the uprising was planned for the Democratic National 
Convention.  Clement Vallandigham would make such an inflammatory speech at the 
Convention that the Democrats of Chicago would rise up and assist the armed men of the 
Sons of Liberty in liberating the Confederate soldiers.  The Sons of Liberty were a 
Copperhead group formed in 1864 that operated in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and 
Missouri.  Essentially, the goal was to draw Sherman northward and away from the South 
which would presumably result in some form of negotiation settlement whereby the 
South would keep their slaves and the “Union as it was” would be restored.  However, 
federal agents had infiltrated the Sons of Liberty and uncovered the plot.  By August 20th, 
Indiana Governor Morton discovered that arms had been shipped to Harrison H. Dodd in 
Indianapolis.  Dodd’s office was searched and the arms and various incriminating letters 
were seized.130         
When the Democratic National Convention convened in Chicago, the city’s 
Republican newspapers announced the presence of large numbers of Sons of Liberty.  
Federal agents kept watch over the city and reinforcements stood guard at the prisoner of 
war camp, Camp Douglas.  The Convention ignored Vallandigham and nominated 
George B. McClellan instead.  With the plot falling apart before their eyes, the leaders of 
the Sons of Liberty stood down from their revolt.  A few days after the Convention 
                                                          
130 Towne, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War, 256-264.  
  
64 
 
ended, Dodd, Grand Commander of the Sons of Liberty in Indiana, was arrested.  
Bowles, Milligan, Horsey, Humphreys, and Heffren were arrested soon thereafter.131     
The Military Commission convened on October 21, 1864 in the United States 
Court House in Indianapolis.  The detail for the Commission was comprised of thirteen 
senior military officers, of which six were in command of Indiana volunteer regiments.  
Each defendant was permitted to retain his own counsel.  Joseph E. McDonald and John 
R. Coffroth were engaged to represent Milligan and Horsey.  McDonald was a former 
Democratic Congressman and State’s Attorney from Indiana.  He had also defeated 
Milligan in the Democratic nomination for Governor in 1864.132  Coffroth was an old 
friend of Milligan and fellow Peace Democrat. Indianapolis Republican attorney 
Jonathan W. Gordon was appointed to represent Humphreys, Bowles, and Heffren.133    
Once the attorneys for the accused were approved by the Commission, the 
defendants objected to the Commission’s jurisdiction on the basis that they were all 
United States citizens and thus entitled to be tried in a civil court.  After deliberation, the 
Commission ruled that the question of jurisdiction would be determined at the conclusion 
of the trial.134  J.W. Gordon, attorney for Humphreys, Bowles, and Heffren, made a 
motion for separate trials of the accused.  He reasoned, “We put this plea on the 
discretion of this Court, as governed by the common law, believing that these defendants 
have interests that cannot be sub-served by trying them together, and as a matter of 
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justice I ask the Court for their severance on trial.”135  Again, after deliberation, the 
Commission determined that no rights of the accused would be prejudiced by a joint trial.   
When it came to trying civilians before military commissions during the Civil 
War, there were no special procedures.  The commission that tried Milligan and his co-
defendants followed the same rules of court-martials that tried soldiers.  Military 
commissions drew their authority from the commanding general.136  Essentially, the 
general had unilateral power to select members of the commission from among his own 
officers.  The defendant was able to challenge the members and attempt to discredit their 
objectivity, but the commission members themselves were the ones to rule on such 
objections. The commission members, consisting of at least five officers, also decided the 
outcome of the case, the sentence, and procedural objections.137  The Judge Advocate 
played the role of both prosecutor and judge.  As judge, he was often asked to deliver to 
the commission legal opinions as objections or questions of law were raised. 138     
Military commission procedures did have some advantages over civilian courts from the 
perspective of the defendant.  A complete trial transcript was kept, which was not the 
case in most civilian courts at the time.139  Therefore, the reviewing body had a record 
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from which they could refer to thus providing a more judicious assessment of the 
defendant’s case.                      
The origins of military commissions in America extend back to the early days of 
the country itself.  In June of 1775, as the American Revolution began to escalate, the 
Continental Congress adopted 69 Articles of War, drawn largely from the British Articles 
of War.140  These Articles of War were administered exclusively by the legislature and 
framed the procedures for courts-martial of soldiers, not civilians.141  A court-martial is 
not a military commission however.  A court-martial is used to apply military law to 
members of the U.S. military.  A military commission applies the laws of war and is used 
to try unlawful enemy combatants or enemy combatants who are charged with violations 
of the laws of war.  In 1787, Samuel Carter, a citizen of New Jersey, was arrested for 
delivering arms to the British.  General George Washington immediately ordered Carter 
to be transferred to a New Jersey civilian court stating, “[I am] not fully satisfied of the 
legality of trying an inhabitant of any State by Military Law, when the Civil authority of 
that State has made provisions for the punishment of persons taking Arms with the 
Enemy.”142  Despite being seventy-nine years apart, Washington’s analysis somewhat 
mirrors Davis’s analysis on the constitutionality of military trials of civilians.      
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Constitutional scholar Louis Fisher notes that with the ratification of the United 
States Constitution in 1787 and the subsequent creation of a new American government, 
military power stemmed from legislative authority as it did during the war.  Pursuant to 
the Constitution, the President was made Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy but 
at the same time was made accountable and subordinate to civilian law.  Under Section 8 
of Article I of the Constitution, it was Congress who was given the power “To define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations” and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces.”  As we have seen, this was not Lincoln’s view at all.  Again, he believed that his 
authority as Commander-in-Chief stemmed from international law and the state of 
rebellion that existed during the Civil War.        
In 1789, legislation was passed that essentially adopted the Articles of War that 
had been used during the Revolutionary War.  In pertinent part, they stated that military 
troops, “shall be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by 
the United States in Congress assembled.”143  In April 1806, Congress enacted a bill that 
consisted of 101 Articles of War, many of which, like the previous Articles of War, set 
forth the rules and procedures for courts-martial.  However, language was added to 
address spies.  Specifically, “all persons not citizens of, or owing allegiance to the United 
States of America, who shall be found lurking as spies…shall suffer death…by sentence 
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of a general court marital.”144  During the Civil War, this same language would be 
incorporated into the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which provided for the trial of civilians 
by military commissions.     
One of the first instances in which military commissions were used to try civilians 
was during the War of 1812 when General Andrew Jackson declared martial law 
throughout the city of New Orleans.145  After the British were defeated Jackson 
maintained the state of martial law.  Louis Louallier, a New Orleans resident, wrote an 
article in a local newspaper declaring that citizens accused of a crime should be tried 
before a civil court, not a military tribunal, and stated that Jackson’s order was “no longer 
compatible with our dignity and our oath of making the Constitution respected.”  On 
March 5, 1815, General Jackson had Louallier arrested for inciting mutiny and 
disaffection within the army.  However, when Federal District Judge Dominick Hall 
granted a writ of habeas corpus for Louallier, Jackson arrested the Judge as well.  Jackson 
was later fined $1,000 for his actions by Judge Hall himself.146  Long before the civil 
liberties issues of the Civil War, we see an emerging argument over the use of military 
commissions.      
Military commissions were once again used to try civilians during the Mexican 
American War.  When American soldiers invaded Mexico, they did not have a stable 
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legal system to prosecute those who violated the law of war.  Therefore, General 
Winfield Scott declared a state of martial law in Mexico for both American soldiers and 
Mexican citizens.  However, when Secretary of War William Marcy submitted a bill to 
authorize these military tribunals, Congress refused to consider it.  In circumnavigating 
the lack of Congressional authority, Scott issued General Orders No. 20 on February 19, 
1847.  This order defined specific crimes committed by civilians and American soldiers 
and declared that those crimes would be tried before military commissions.  Scott never 
did receive Congressional permission for his military commissions and after the war the 
Supreme Court overturned many of Scott’s actions and the actions of other officers who 
ordered military trials of civilians.147  
In Jecker v. Montgomery (1852), the Supreme Court ruled that under the 
Constitution, judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as 
Congress shall establish.  Neither the executive nor any of its military officers could 
establish a court in a conquered country.  In a unanimous decision, written by Justice 
Taney, the Court stated that military commissions established in Mexico “were nothing 
more than the agents of military power” and “were not courts of the United States, and 
had no right to adjudicate.”148  These early legal challenges to military commissions did 
not yet revolve around civil liberties however.  Instead they relied on the usurpation of 
executive power.  It would take civil libertarian-minded jurists, like David Davis, to bring 
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constitutional liberalism to the forefront of the law in order to establish a conversation 
about civil liberties during wartime.      
The most expansive use of military commissions, however, occurred not in a 
foreign country, but rather on domestic soil during the American Civil War.  It was 
during this four year domestic rebellion when civil liberties issues would appear on a 
grand scale.  These Civil War-era military commissions were not initially established by 
Congress but rather by President Lincoln and his field commanders.  In many situations, 
particularly in the Border States, the loyalty of civil courts was deemed questionable.  
Military law therefore, replaced civilian law to ensure offenses such as resisting the draft, 
disloyal speech, and the overthrow of state government would be adequately dealt with.  
After declaring martial law and establishing military commissions in areas such as 
Missouri and Maryland, President Lincoln convinced Congress to recognize and approve, 
retroactively, his Presidential acts.  In 1863, one particular piece of legislation declared 
“all persons…found lurking as spies…shall be triable by a general court-martial or 
military commission.”149  Many federal judges during the war, like Taney and Perkins, 
attempted to maintain their authority to uphold the rule of law but were either curtailed or 
simply ignored by military officials.150  It was on this legal battleground where Milligan 
was taken from the ordinary course of civilian law and tried before a military 
commission.     
                                                          
149 An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, U.S. 
Statutes as Large, 755 (1863).   
150 Fisher, “Military Tribunals: Historical Patterns and Lessons,” 16-20.  
  
71 
 
  The treason trial of Milligan and his co-defendants reconvened on October 22, 
1864.  In addition to reserving the question of the Military Commission’s jurisdiction 
until after the trial, during the examination of William M. Harrison on October 22, a Sons 
of Liberty pamphlet entitled, “Proceedings of the Grand Council of the State of Indiana,” 
was entered into evidence by the Judge Advocate before the defense had an opportunity 
to examine and challenge it.  Harrison’s attorney objected stating, “In all courts of justice, 
before a document can be offered into evidence, all these distinct facts as to its identity 
are gone into and proved.  And when a document has once gone into evidence, we cannot 
object to it.  If it goes in evidence on insufficient identity, how are we to remedy it?”151  
In other words, proper procedure under the common law dictated that the defense have 
the opportunity to review the evidence and to object to it.  The Commission, however, 
overruled the objection and the pamphlet was let into evidence.  This was not a common 
law court.     
The Military Commission also accepted into evidence one particular speech 
Milligan made in August 1864, in Fort Wayne, Indiana.  W.L. Bush, a reporter for the 
Cincinnati Gazette, testified as to the content of this speech.   
Q: State to the court what was said by Mr. Milligan on the 
state of the country, whether it was prosperous or 
otherwise?  
A: He referred to the country as desolated by this war, and 
the oppressions of the Administration.  That was the 
general tenor of his remarks on that point.  
Q: What did he state in reference to the freedom of the 
press and of speech? 
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A: He spoke of the freedom of speech allowed as simply 
that granted by a Lincoln mob-as a freedom in name rather 
that in fact.   
Q: What did he say in reference to the draft or 
conscription? 
A: He stated, if the war was right, the draft was right, and if 
they considered the war right, and were good citizens, they 
would not grumble about the draft.      
Q: What else did he say about the rightfulness of the war? 
A: He denied the war was right, and proceeded to argue, 
that under the Constitution the President had no power to 
coerce a State. 
Q: What did he say about the President of the United 
States? 
A: He spoke of him as a tyrant, and an usurper, I think.      
Q: Did he denounce arbitrary arrests?  
A: I think he did.  
 
 
No direct evidence was ever introduced that Milligan did anything other than oppose the 
war and vehemently criticize the Lincoln administration.  Yet, the Military Commission 
interpreted his speech to be treasonous and disloyal.  Milligan’s attorney, on the other 
hand, argued his client was simply being punished for criticizing a Republican 
administration’s prosecution of a war he did not believe in.  Testimony concluded and 
closing arguments were presented on December 6.  After deliberation, the Commission 
found the defendants guilty and sentenced Milligan, Bowles, and Horsey to death and 
Humphreys to hard labor for life.152         
While waiting for his execution, Milligan sent a letter to his long-time friend, 
Edwin Stanton, pleading for his intervention.  “I have been condemned to die without 
evidence,” he wrote, “please examine the facts and advise the President do this much for 
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an old acquaintance and friend.”153  There is no evidence that Stanton replied.  At the 
same time, Milligan’s attorney, Joseph McDonald, who had practiced on the Illinois 
circuit with Lincoln, traveled to Washington to personally request clemency for his client.  
McDonald recorded his meeting with the President: 
He went over the history of my client’s crimes as shown by 
the papers in this case, and suggested certain errors and 
imperfections in the record.  The papers, he said, would 
have to be returned for correction, and that would consume 
no little time.  “You may go home, Mr. McDonald,” he 
said, with a pleased expression.  “And I’ll send for you 
when the papers get back; but I apprehend and hope there 
will be such a jubilee over yonder,” he added, pointing to 
the hills of Virginia just across the river, “we shall none of 
us want any more killing done.”154    
 
 
We, of course, cannot say for certain what Lincoln’s final decision would have been.  He 
was assassinated before the corrected papers could be returned.  However, his comments 
about no more killing suggests that he was planning to either commute Milligan’s 
sentence or release him.  Unfortunately, Lincoln’s assassination at the hand of a 
Southerner ruined any hope of mercy for both the defendants and the South as a whole.  
Caught up in the disquiet after Lincoln’s assassination, President Johnson vowed to 
“make treason odious.”155  He ordered the execution of Milligan and his co-conspirators 
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to be carried out on May 19, 1865, six days after he himself authorized the military trial 
of those implicated in Lincoln’s assassination.156   
In a last-ditch effort, Milligan’s lawyer sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
federal circuit court in Indianapolis where David Davis sat on circuit duty.  Meanwhile, 
other attorneys and Milligan’s wife pleaded with President Johnson to commute 
Milligan’s sentence to life in prison.157  Justice David Davis intervened as well by 
traveling to Indianapolis to speak with Governor Morton, who had been one of the 
leading voices in trying Milligan before a military commission in the first place.  During 
a Sunday afternoon ride, Davis attempted to convince Morton that the Military 
Commission had been illegal since the civilian courts in Indiana had been open and 
functioning and that martial law had not been declared in the state.  Morton was 
convinced to save Milligan’s life.  The Governor reasoned that if the defendants had been 
convicted unlawfully, he did not want to be responsible for it. He immediately wrote to 
Johnson advising him to commute their sentences.158  This visit to Morton was the first of 
many steps Davis took to directly intervene on Milligan’s behalf.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
On May 10, 1865, Milligan’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed with the 
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.  It was heard the next day by 
Judge David Davis, the Circuit Justice, and David McDonald, the District Judge.  
Procedurally, a divided decision on the writ meant that the case would be elevated to the 
United States Supreme Court.  The next day, the two judges wrote a letter to President 
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Johnson stating, “We beg leave also most respectfully to state that, aside from the legal 
question, which we press most earnestly, we doubt the policy of the proposed execution.  
We fear its effect upon the public mind in Indiana.  By many, these men will be regarded 
as political martyrs.”159  By today’s standards this would seem to be extremely 
inappropriate.  It should be noted that the judges started the letter by stipulating to the 
defendants’ guilt and that their primary concern was that the Military Commission was 
“unknown to Common Law.”160  Procedurally then, they asked Johnson to delay the 
execution until the defendants had an opportunity to appeal their case to the Supreme 
Court.  While this letter seems to point to Davis’s political considerations concerning 
military commissions, this strategy was most likely used to convince Johnson of the 
political ramifications of executing the defendants in a state full of Peace Democrats.  For 
Davis though, proper legal procedures and civil liberties remained first and foremost. 
While a Republican, Davis shared many of the political principles of Northern 
Democrats regarding emancipation.  In fact, throughout the war, Davis constantly advised 
Lincoln on the dangers of waging a war against slavery.  Illinois Republican Senator 
Orville Browning wrote in his diary on January 19, 1863: "In conversation with Judge 
Davis of the Supreme Court this morning he told me that he had a conversation with the 
President yesterday in which he represented to him the alarming condition of things, and 
urged upon him to reconstruct his cabinet, and change his [emancipation] policy, as the 
only means of saving the Country. The President told him that this proclamation in regard 
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to slavery was a fixed thing-that he intended to adhere to it, and whether he changed his 
cabinet must be determined by future events."161  Davis’s advice to Lincoln to reverse 
course on emancipation could be construed as evidence that his intent in Milligan was to 
restrict black rights during Reconstruction South by returning judicial power to local 
civilian courts including courts in the South.  As explored in the last chapter, Davis was 
not as progressive as Lincoln on issues of slavery and race.    
Up until this point and as we will see in his majority opinion, Davis was simply 
concerned with military commissions in the North.  More importantly, though, it is 
apparent that Davis went out of his way to ensure that Milligan’s case would reach the 
Supreme Court, so that Radical Republican-backed military tribunals in the North, and 
thus Republican partisanship, could be finally scrutinized before the highest court in the 
land.   
Following the request of Davis and McDonald, President Johnson initially would 
not even review Milligan’s case.  Johnson stated, “The very fact of the prisoner resorting 
to the court upon a technical question of jurisdiction is a confession of guilt.”162  Without 
leaving any reason for his change of mind, Johnson considered Davis and McDonald’s 
plea and on May 30, 1865, commuted all the sentences to life in prison.   
Even if Johnson had not commuted Milligan to life in prison, the habeas corpus 
petition itself conformed to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 in that a grand jury had 
convened since Milligan’s arrest and submitted no indictment against him.  According to 
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the Act, therefore, Milligan should have been released from military custody.  However, 
if Davis and McDonald had issued the writ, they knew the military would simply 
disregard it, as it had done so throughout the war.  In fact, General Hovey was under 
strict orders to ignore any habeas corpus writ issued by a civilian court.  Therefore, after 
hearing the petition, Davis and McDonald certified that they differed in opinion, thus 
placing the case in the hands of the United States Supreme Court in accordance with 
appellate procedure.163         
Arguments before the Supreme Court were heard from March 5th to March 13th 
1866, two months after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and at the same time 
when the continuance of military rule in the South was being debated in the chambers of 
Congress.  For the government stood former General Benjamin Butler, Attorney General 
James Speed, and Ohio attorney Henry Stanbery.  The Petitioners were represented by 
future U.S. President James A. Garfield, Jeremiah Black, and David Dudley Field, older 
brother of Justice Stephen J. Field.  Attorneys with cases before the Supreme Court were 
usually only permitted two hours to argue. Three hours of argument were allotted for 
each attorney in Milligan.  At this time, the Supreme Court relied more on oral argument 
than written briefs.164  The additional hour given to counsel may point to the possibility 
that the members of the Court understood the importance of the case before them and 
therefore wanted to give extra attention to both sides.  It is also important to note that in 
addition to arguing against expanded presidential war powers and martial law in order to 
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discredit the Military Commission’s jurisdiction, counsel for Milligan also used the same 
civil libertarian language that Judges Perkins and Davis had been using throughout the 
war.  In fact, many of the civil liberty arguments advanced by Milligan’s attorneys would 
be incorporated into Davis’s own majority opinion.  A more detailed analysis of this 
opinion will be covered in the next chapter.   
Henry Stanbery opened for the government, narrowing his remarks to the question 
of jurisdiction. Benjamin Butler would argue on the merits.  Stanbery argued that the 
Supreme Court did not possess jurisdiction to review the case of Lambdin Milligan under 
the Act of 1802, which prohibited the Supreme Court from hearing ex parte cases.  He 
stated, “All the cases before this court, during all the time that this jurisdiction has 
existed, are cases between parties, and stated in the usual formula A. v. B…all the rules 
of this court exclude the idea of an ex parte case under the head of appellate 
jurisdiction.”165  The Judiciary Act of 1802 read:   
That whenever any question shall occur before a circuit 
court, upon which the opinions of the judges shall be 
opposed, the point upon which the disagreement shall 
happen, shall, during the same term, upon the request of 
either party, or their counsel, be stated under the direction 
of the judges, and certified under the seal of the court, to 
the supreme court166 
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For Stanbery, the language “upon the request of either party” intimated a cause of action 
between two parties but since Davis and McDonald had only acted on behalf of Milligan 
the situation did not meet the two party standard under the Act of 1802.167   
But then Stanbery made what may be considered a blunder. Misreading and 
misapplying an old Latin dictum, he argued “conventional and legislative laws and 
enactments are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the 
supreme law.”168  Here, we see perhaps the most radical expression of the necessity 
argument that Lincoln had taken as commander-in-chief.  To be clear, at this point 
Lincoln had been assassinated and never made this argument.  Stanbery argued that the 
very nature of a domestic insurrection necessitated the expansion of presidential war 
powers beyond legal constitutional limits.  (Lincoln himself believed that presidential war 
powers expanded, but within the Constitution by way of the commander-in-chief clause 
and only within the limits of international law or the laws of war.)  Furthermore, Stanbery 
relied heavily on Lincoln’s habeas corpus proclamation of 1862 which provided for the 
military trial of civilians.169 
Attorney General James Speed then argued on the merits of the case.  Butler 
would later rejoin.  Military commissions, according to Speed, established their authority 
from martial law and that it was therefore only by military law that commission 
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proceedings could have been reviewed.  He then explained why military commissions 
were vital to times of war.   
It would be impossible for the commanding general of an 
army to investigate each fact which might be supposed to 
interfere with his movements, endanger his safety, aid his 
enemy, or bring disorder and crime into the community 
under his charge.  He, therefore, must commit to his 
officers, and in practice, to a board of officers, as a tribunal, 
the charge of examining the circumstances and reporting 
the facts in each particular case.170      
 
Here, Speed made an exegesis of war argument.  Because a commander in the field does 
not have time to examine the dangers posed to his army by civilian populations under 
martial law, military commissions must conduct such investigations for the safety of the 
military force.   
 Speed also made the argument that the President as Commander-in-Chief is not 
constrained by the Constitution.  He stated that when Lincoln suspended habeas corpus 
during the war, it “was an exercise of his sovereignty in carrying on war” and that “his 
powers must be without limit.  New difficulties [during war] are constantly arising, and 
new combinations are at once to be thwarted, which the slow movement of legislative 
action cannot meet.”171  In other words, according to Speed, Congress is wholly incapable 
of keeping up with the ever-evolving nature of war and making decisions regarding those 
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events.  Following Speed’s logic then, the President is the only one who could make such 
time sensitive decisions.   
 In regards to the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments, Speed contended that “these, in 
truth, are all peace provisions of the Constitution and, like all other conventional and 
legislative laws and enactments, are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people 
becomes the supreme law.”172  Essentially, Speed was forwarding the argument that there 
were no limitations on the war-making and war-conducting powers of Congress or the 
President.  This outlandish idea did not go over well with the Court.  Justice Miller, in a 
private letter, said that “the session of the Court has developed his utter want of ability as 
lawyer-He is certainly one of the feeblest men who has addressed the Court this term.”173  
Butler’s performance at the end of oral argument would not be any more convincing.            
The case for the Petitioners was initiated by Republican James Garfield.  He 
opened with a breadth of both English and American legal history.  In response to 
Stanbery, Garfield argued, “The only ground on which the learned counsel attempts to 
establish the authority of the military commission to try these petitioners is that of the 
necessity of the case.  I answer, there was no such necessity.”174  For Garfield, then, 
necessity was simply a matter of geography.   
But what is the nature of that necessity.  If, at this 
moment, Lee, with his rebel army at one end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue, and Grant with his army of the 
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Union at the other…were approaching this Capitol…I 
have no doubt they would expel Your Honors from the 
bench.  The jurisdiction of battle would supersede the 
jurisdiction of law.  This court would be silenced by the 
thunders of war.  It has been fully settled that those states 
constituted a belligerent government de facto, against 
which the federal government might extend absolute 
military jurisdiction over every foot of rebel territory.175     
 
It should be noted that “necessity” was not just a catchphrase used by Lincoln and 
his military commanders in the field.  Rather it was the rationale for the entire laws of 
war and of the Emancipation Proclamation.  Garfield was drawing the line of necessity in 
a geographical sense.  He also admitted that there were times in which civilian law was 
silent.  “But the military jurisdiction does not extend beyond the territory of the rebellious 
states, expect where the tide of war actually sweeps beyond the limits and makes it 
impossible for the civil courts to exercise their functions.”176  During the drafting of his 
majority opinion, Davis would take the same geographical standard for necessity.    
Garfield clarified his position by stating to the Court that he did not want a 
decision that would restrict Congressional authority in Reconstruction South.  Having no 
such necessity in the North, argued Garfield, Milligan should have been charged under 
criminal law, not military law.  On the issue of whether the Constitution was “silent” 
during the war, Garfield pronounced, “Such a doctrine…is too monstrous to be tolerated 
for a moment.  The just and final settlement of this great question will take a high place 
among the great achievements which have immortalized this decade.  It will establish 
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forever this truth, that a republic can wield the vast enginery [sic] of war without 
breaking down the safeguards of liberty.”177  In other words, contrary to Stanbery’s 
argument, the abrogation of civil liberties should not be the absolute rule in times of war.  
In fact, his argument would closely follow Davis’s majority opinion, in that he supported 
military commissions in certain cases, that of those in the South where an actual state of 
war existed.  Davis would also go on to follow Garfield’s defense of the Bill of Rights in 
that, “the Constitution and the laws of the United States have carefully provided for the 
protection of individual liberty and the right of accused persons to a speedy trial before a 
tribunal established and regulated by law.”178  Here we see the emergence of 
constitutional liberalism in which the law is centering on individual liberties.    
Democrat Jeremiah Black, former Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, Attorney General, and Secretary of State under Buchanan addressed the Court 
next.  Black explained that the “strange tribunal” under which his clients were tried 
possessed neither the jurisdiction to convict them or even hear the case itself.  He 
explained by referencing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, “which was passed with 
express reference to persons precisely in the situation of these men, declares that they 
shall be delivered up for trial to the proper civil authorities.”179  According to this act, if 
an individual was being detained by an executive order and was not indicted by a grand 
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jury, he was to be released.  Black pointed out that Milligan had not been indicted by a 
grand jury and was therefore held illegally by military authorities.   
After the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 was passed on September 15, Republicans 
were more at ease about Lincoln’s actions.  Now there was legislative authority to 
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In short, by this act, Congress had 
endorse the president’s earlier unilateral suspensions.  Yet, civil liberties issues continued 
to be debated among Democrats.  They commented on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 
saying, “his own party admitted his usurpation long afterward, and after hundreds of like 
cases had occurred, by passing an act of Congress to save him from the consequences of 
his arbitrary use of power.”180  Ironically, the act was now being used by a Democratic 
attorney to defend a Peace Democrat who had publically denounced Lincoln.        
Moving up from statutory construction to constitutional law, Black also argued 
that Indiana was not in a theatre of war when Milligan was arrested and “the courts were 
wide open, where judicial process was executed every day without interruption, and 
where all the civil authorities, both State and National, were in full exercise of their 
functions.”181  According to Black, Milligan should not have been tried by a military 
commission because under the suspension clause suspension was only allowed in time of 
actual invasion or rebellion.  To this he tacitly added, in the location of actual invasion or 
rebellion as well.  Davis would reach the same conclusion in his majority opinion and 
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conclusively declare that military commissions in the North were illegal where the 
civilian courts were open and functioning.   
Scholars such as Stephen Towne have argued that evidence suggests that 
“political leaders chose not to try the conspirators in civilian courts speaks to their lack of 
faith in the judicial process at a time of national emergency rather than the lack of 
evidence of conspiracy.”182  For Towne, Copperheads did in fact possess a threat to the 
Midwest and the war in general.  In accordance with his client’s best interests, it seems 
Black implied the Copperhead movement was not a serious threat to the war effort and 
that therefore there was not a real invasion or rebellion.  Agreeing with Black, Davis 
would declare that Indiana was not in a state of war and thus Milligan should have been 
turned over to a civilian court.   
During Reconstruction, this theatre of war argument would resurface.  Despite 
Davis’s opinion in Milligan, military trials of civilians continued.  However, from July 
1867 to March 1877, the southern states were technically under martial law by virtue of 
congressionally created military districts, thus justifying the continuation of military 
commissions.  Radical Republicans who set up these military districts and tribunals 
understood that they were necessary to protect freedmen from an all-white southern 
judicial system but Davis’s majority opinion seemingly put them back into place.  As we 
will see though, Davis’s opinion was not intended to prohibit military commissions in the 
Reconstruction South as Radical Republicans thought.     
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Black, like Garfield, also invoked the 6th Amendment of the Bill of Rights in 
defense of Milligan:   
[W]hen they [founding fathers] came to frame a 
government for themselves and their posterity, had 
failed to insert a provision making the trial by jury 
perpetual and universal, they would have proved 
themselves recreant to the principles of that liberty 
of which they professed to be the special 
champions.183   
 
Black was arguing that the founders understood that citizens in a democracy could not be 
ruled by a government that punished without restraint.  Furthermore, “[t]hey went over 
Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, and the rules of the common law, 
and whatever was found there to favor individual liberty they carefully inserted in their 
own system.”184   Davis would take the same “strict constructionist” view, in that the 
Constitution applies both in war and in peace.  As Robert H. Churchill explains in To 
Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of 
the Militia Movement, “strict construction” in this context reflects an Antifederalist rather 
than a Federalist understanding of proper constitutional construction.  This makes sense 
in light of Copperhead support of state’s rights and Davis’s defense of Peace Democrats’ 
civil liberties during the war.           
David Dudley Field, brother of Justice Stephen J. Field, closed the case for the 
Petitioners by stating that the authority of Congress to establish martial law should not 
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have been an issue since Congress had not established martial law at all.  “The source and 
origin of the power to establish military commissions, if it exists at all, is in the assumed 
power to declare what is called martial law.  I say what is called martial law; for, strictly 
there is no such thing as martial law; it is martial rule.”185  Field went on to explain what 
he meant by martial law as being no law at all.  For Field, a liberal advocate of legal 
codification and opponent of judge-made common law, the abolition of civil law could 
only mean replacing civil law with the will of the military commander.  The laws of war 
were to diffuse and uncodified to have much meaning for him.  In other words, by 
extension of executive power, the president, had the power during a time of war to 
suspend the Constitution and the laws of the nation and put himself in their place.  
Lincoln had eventually come to adopt the international law position that as commander-
in-chief he was restrained by the laws of war during the war.  Field was arguing against 
this.  For Field, martial law was tantamount to a dictatorship, which had no authority in 
the U.S. Constitution.  At stake in Ex parte Milligan was whether uncodified international 
law rooted in precedent and legal treatise would have a place in American jurisprudence 
or whether constitutional liberalism and the Bill of Rights would reign supreme for civil 
liberties even during wartime.    
Like his co-counsel, Field defended the Bill of Rights over international law, 
specifically the 5th Amendment.  Field stated that it was “made for a state of war as well 
as a state of peace; it was aimed at the military authority, as well as the civil; and it was 
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as explicit as our mother tongue could make them.”186  Again, this was almost verbatim 
what Davis would write in his majority opinion when he wrote that the Constitution is a 
law for rulers and people, in times of war and peace.187  It seems that while Davis 
intervened in several civil liberties cases throughout the war, these other constitutional 
liberal-minded attorneys began to contemplate the theoretical framework for 
constitutional liberalism.  Davis did not leave behind any writings that explained his state 
of mind during oral argument or the drafting process, but it seems to be the case that 
Field, Black, and Garfield helped Davis conceptualize the civil liberties issues that he had 
already been fighting for.  In other words, by creating a national military power and thus 
putting a federal police power in the North had created the need for limits on that very 
power.  This in turn gave liberals like Field a chance to nudge common law judges like 
Davis away from the quaint world of precedent and legal treatise and into the modern 
world of legal liberalism.             
Benjamin Butler replied for the government.  As a general during the war, Butler 
had declared martial law on New Orleans and tried numerous civilians by military 
commissions.  He too expounded on a plethora of precedents, including the famous 1864 
case Ex parte Vallandigham in which the Supreme Court ruled that it had no authority to 
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review the Military Commission that convicted Congressman Vallandigham since the 
Military Commission was not considered a court under the Judicial Act of 1789.  
According to Butler, it followed that the Court had no authority to review Milligan’s case 
either.   
Butler was wrong in his analysis however.  In Vallandigham, the Court did not 
have authority to review appeals directly from a military commission.  In Milligan, 
however, the appeal came from Davis and McDonald’s federal circuit court on a habeas 
corpus petition.  The Supreme Court did have authority to review appeals directly from 
lower federal courts.  Butler also addressed the president’s powers under martial law.  
Quoting from Brown v. The United States (1814), Butler stated, “The sovereignty, as to 
declaring war and limiting its effects, rests with the legislature.  The sovereignty as to its 
execution rests with the President.”188 Butler pointed out that Congress had ratified 
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and establishment of martial law, thus 
ending any debate over who had the power to initiate such acts.189   
Arguments concluded on March 13, 1866.  On April 3, the Court issued an order 
directing the writ of habeas corpus be issued because the Military Commission had had 
no jurisdiction to try and sentence the defendants.  The opinion of the Court, however, 
was not read until the beginning of the next term in December 1866.  Judge David Davis 
returned to Bloomington, Illinois to write what would become his legal career’s crowning 
achievement.  Joining Davis’s opinion for the majority were three of the four Democratic 
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appointees from before the war, together with Stephen J. Field, a War Democrat 
appointed by Lincoln.  Joining the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Chase were 
Lincoln appointees Swayne and Miller, as well as Justice Wayne, appointed by Jackson.  
Davis had actually lobbied Lincoln to elevate Swayne to Chief Justice in 1864.  In a letter 
to the president, Davis pointed out that although Swayne had strong political opinions, he 
had never been an active partisan.  “To place a mere partisan in such a position weakens 
an administration and lessens the respect that should attach to the decision of the 
Court.”190  This letter illustrates, once again, Davis’s anti-Partyism specifically when it 
came to the judiciary.  Rising above the political fray became more than just lip-service 
for Davis, it became his career’s endeavor.  As we will see, his majority opinion in 
Milligan was reflective of his own political restraint on the bench and his unwavering 
concern over civil liberties.         
Davis’s majority opinion and Chase’s concurring opinion were in agreement on 
the fundamental issue that the trial and sentencing of Milligan by the Military 
Commission was unconstitutional.  Both opinions also rejected the Stanbery argument 
that a civilian’s constitutional rights are suspended in times of war or rebellion, “inter 
arma, silent leges.”  However, on the point of congressional authority to establish 
military commissions, the two opinions differed sharply.  This aspect of Milligan would 
be the hinge on which Radicals would view the opinion as a challenge to military 
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commissions in the South.  In order to fully understand Davis’s reasoning in Milligan, a 
close reading and analysis of his majority opinion will be provided in the next chapter.                 
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CHAPTER IV 
“A LAW FOR RULERS AND PEOPLE” 191: 
DAVID DAVIS’S MAJORITY 
 OPINION 
 
 
“Not a word is said in the opinion [Ex parte Milligan] about reconstruction, & the 
power [to try by military commission] is conceded in the insurrectionary States.”192  This 
letter by Davis to his brother in law Julius Rockwell is conclusive in making the case that 
Davis did not intend for Milligan to apply to the South.  Yet, thorough historical analysis 
dictates that we must look for other pieces of evidence to make the strongest argument 
possible.  So far, we have examined Davis’s wartime record in which he only intervened 
in Northern military commissions while at the same time upholding Lincoln’s war time 
actions in the Prize Cases.  We must now look to the Milligan decision for further 
analysis.  In its historical context, certain legal niceties and the political aspects of 
Davis’s majority opinion shaped the Radical Republican view that the opinion applied to
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the South, striking down military commissions there and thus eliminating one of the few 
legal instruments to protect freedmen’s rights.  Davis, in reality, was tempering wartime 
excesses of nationalism and not leaving blacks to the mercy of Southerners.  By 
examining the opinion, we can then begin to appreciate why Radicals, understandably, 
launched attacks on the Court in response to Milligan including reducing its members and 
limiting its appellate jurisdiction, all of which contributed to Reconstruction’s already-
existing political instability and partisanship.  We can also continue to trace Davis’s 
evolution as a non-partisan civil libertarian, as he placed a heavy emphasis on the Bill of 
Rights over international law.        
On December 17, 1866, the following term after oral argument, the Court 
delivered its opinion in what is now called the “Old Senate Chamber” at the Capitol 
building.  The room teemed with attorneys and members of Congress.  Journalists from 
the Associated Press and the Senate official reporter were ordered by the clerk of the 
court not to take any notes whatsoever because the Court did not want anyone 
misinterpreting or misstating the opinion.  Not until January 1, 1867 was the opinion 
published in full.193  
Writing for the majority, Davis held that military commissions and the laws and 
usages of war that establish them “can never be applied to citizens in states which have 
upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process 
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unobstructed.”194  Neither the President nor Congress had the authority to establish such 
military trials.  After outlining the facts of the case, including the proceedings of the 
Military Commission, Davis provided an analysis of whether or not the Military 
Commission had jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan.  To this Davis concluded, 
“The importance of the main question presented by this record cannot be overstated; for it 
involves the very framework of the government and the fundamental principles of 
American liberty.”195  With this sweeping statement, Davis began outlining a firm 
remonstration of the government’s actions against Milligan and of others in the North 
who had faced trial by military commissions.  It was for those same Northern Peace 
Democrats that he had intervened for throughout the Civil War.                
He began by responding to Stanbery’s argument that the Supreme Court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear Milligan’s case due to its ex parte nature and that all cases 
before the Court had to have two opposing parties.  Davis concluded that even though it 
was docketed as an ex parte case, notice was given at the Circuit Court level to Indiana’s 
District Attorney, who did in fact appear and agree to have the habeas corpus petition 
certified by Davis and McDonald.  When the two judges could not agree, it was 
submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration.196  While not abundantly clear nor 
even really vital to the heart of my principle contention, Davis concluded that he and his 
colleagues could hear Milligan’s case as ex parte, due to the fact that the District 
Attorney appeared in Circuit Court on behalf of the government.  In other words, in 
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Davis’s mind because the two opposing sides were present in Circuit Court (Milligan and 
the District Attorney) it was not actually an ex parte case but rather a normal case 
consisting of two parties.      
In response to Butler’s argument that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus 
authorized the military arrest and trial of Milligan, Davis stated that, “The suspension of 
the writ does not authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denies to one arrested the 
privilege of this writ in order to obtain his liberty.”197  In other words, habeas corpus has 
nothing to do with military trials, but rather the ability to challenge one’s detention.  
Davis went on to acknowledge the circumstances under which the president had authority 
to suspend the writ.  He stated that when the public safety demanded, the president could 
arrest a suspected person without giving a cause on return to a writ of habeas corpus.  
“But it was not contemplated that such person should be detained in custody beyond a 
certain fixed period, unless certain judicial proceedings, known to common law, were 
commenced against him.”198  Taking line of argument from Black, Davis noted that 
Milligan had not been indicted by a Grand Jury and that according to the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1863, he was thus entitled to be released from military custody.   
Davis finally concluded that the Court did have jurisdiction to hear Milligan’s 
case by virtue of the fact that the Supreme Court had the authority to review habeas 
corpus petitions and in Milligan’s petition he plead that he had been detained under order 
of the President, that he was a citizen of Indiana and had never been in the military, and 
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that the Grand Jury in Indiana had adjourned without filing any indictment against him, 
all in violation of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863.199     
He then proceeded to address counsel’s arguments in chief but not before stating 
the controlling question once more: Had the Military Commission jurisdiction to try and 
sentence Milligan?  Driving home the importance of the case before the Court, Davis 
again pronounced, “No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which 
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the birthright of every 
American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to the 
law.”200  That law, as he would spell out in his majority opinion, was the United States 
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.  This would be in direct opposition to 
Lincoln’s use of international law via the Commander-in-Chief clause.  
When he took office, Lincoln’s knowledge and experience with international law, 
specifically the laws of war, was negligible.  Yet, over the course of the war he would 
learn to use the laws of war to the North’s advantage and even go so far as to redefine 
them.  Historically, the laws of war had humanitarian limits.  One of these limits was the 
permanent confiscation of personal property.  John Fabian Witt in Lincoln’s Code points 
out, “Even if Lincoln had thought it prudent to emancipate slaves in Missouri (in 
reference to General John Frémont’s emancipation declaration of 1861) he concluded that 
the customs and usages of warfare prevented him from doing so.”201  But as the war wore 
on, Lincoln stepped closer to emancipation.  In May 1862, Major General David Hunter 
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mirrored Frémont’s emancipation order, this time in South Carolina.  Again Lincoln 
revoked the order stating, “Whether at any time, in any case, it shall have become a 
necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government, to exercise such supposed 
power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself.”202  Here we see 
for the first time Lincoln envisioning the possibility of emancipation but only at the 
necessary time defined by himself and only through his authority as Commander-in-
Chief.  In July 1862, Lincoln officially declared that emancipation of the slaves was a 
necessary war measure warranted by military necessity.  As Witt notes, “The military 
necessity test tethered the means allowed to the justice of the end in view.  Justice-God’s 
justice-was precisely what Lincoln had in mind.”203  Because Lincoln believed the 
North’s cause was just and superior, he redefined the humanitarian limits of confiscation 
within the laws of war.  It was the laws of war that also allowed for the criminal trial of 
individuals by military commissions and that upheld the authority of the executive branch 
in the role of Commander-in-Chief, as when Lincoln used emancipation as a military 
necessity.204                      
William Blair in With Malice Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil 
War Era argues that while Lincoln did use international precedents in blockading the 
South, emancipating slaves, and curtailing civil liberties such as habeas corpus, it is 
doubtful that he consciously enlisted international law to defend his actions.  When he 
defended the Emancipation Proclamation in a letter to James C. Conkling, he explained 
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how he used both domestic and international law.  Lincoln insisted that the proclamation 
endowed the Commander-in-Chief “with the law of war, in time of war.” He then asked, 
“Is there-has there ever been-any question that by the law of war, property, both of 
enemies and friends, may be taken when needed?”205  It was this wide interpretation of 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause that Lincoln wielded to not only emancipate the slaves 
and blockade Southern ports but more importantly authorizes the military trial of civilians 
in the North.        
Davis, in his majority opinion, continued with an analysis of the 4th Amendment, 
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures; the 5th Amendment, requiring indictment 
by a grand jury and the right not to be denied of life, liberty, or property except by due 
process; and the 6th Amendment, providing the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases; 
all of which had, in his view, been violated by the Military Commission that convicted 
Milligan.  Davis contended that the Military Commission did not possess authority 
because the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments were guaranteed to all United States citizens, in 
war and peace.  “These securities for personal liberty thus embodied, were such as 
wisdom and experience and demonstrated to be necessary for the protection of those 
accused of crime.”206    Therefore, according to Davis, the Constitution (Bill of Rights) 
superseded the laws of war (international law.)   
Davis then continued with perhaps the most famous passage of the opinion: 
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The Constitution of the United States is a law for 
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with it the shield of protection of all classes 
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.  
No doctrine…was ever invented by the wit of man 
than that any of its provisions can be suspended 
during any of the great exigencies of government.  
Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchism or 
despotism…207     
 
 
Here we see an apparent contradiction in terms.  If the Constitution applies to all in both 
peace and war, how could Milligan have applied only to those military commissions in 
the North and not in the South?  And would this not eliminate all protections for Black 
defendants facing all white juries in the South just as Davis’s radical opponents 
contended?   
According to her provocative dissertation, Karin Petlack, in this period Black 
freedom could come only at the expense of white civil liberties. For instance, in 
Cincinnati when the war started, whites voted in a Democratic mayor whose racism and 
corruption spread throughout the city.  Frequent assaults on Blacks occurred.  In 1863, a 
Republican mayor was elected.  Immediately he replaced the corrupt police force and a 
new Union general was appointed to command the military district.  This new general 
issued an order that all persons supporting the Confederacy through actions or speech 
would be arrested and subject to hanging.  The restriction of white civil liberties allowed 
African Americans to establish their first newspaper, expand their churches and school 
board, and walk the streets of Cincinnati free from attacks by white citizens and the 
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police.208  If Petlack is correct, then only military law could protect Black freedom during 
the Civil War and Reconstruction.  And it was precisely this military protection that 
Davis seemed to deny to African Americans in Ex parte Milligan.       
One could argue that this passage is a reflection upon Davis’s poor drafting 
abilities, which he acknowledged himself.  He may have been caught up in the fervor of 
defending civil liberties that he was unaware of how contradictory his statement really 
was.   One could also argue that in the back of his mind, this standard could only be 
applied to those who actually upheld and respected the laws of the federal government, 
thus eliminating the states in actual rebellion.        
Davis went on to explain that the Military Commission that tried Milligan was not 
a legitimate court, established by Congress under Article III of the Constitution.  Nor 
could it have convened on the mandate of the President because his powers were limited 
to executing the laws, not making them.  Even Lincoln’s use of international law and the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause did not authorize the use of military commissions, 
according to Davis.  The laws and usages of war “can never be applied to citizens in 
states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open 
and their process unobstructed.”209   
This was a crucial formulation.  It was the first passage in Davis’s majority 
opinion signaling that he intended Milligan to apply only to the North.  If, according to 
Davis, international law and thus military commissions could never be used in states 
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where federal authority was upheld, then it follows that military commissions could be 
used in the South where federal authority obviously had not been upheld.   Like Black, 
Davis also pointed out that the civilian courts were open and functioning in Indiana and 
therefore “no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offence whatever 
of a citizen in civil life, in no wise connected with the military service.”210  For Davis 
then, international law (laws and usages of war) should not apply to non-combatant 
citizens in areas where civilian courts were open and functioning.       
 In an obiter dicta regarding Congressional authorization of military commissions, 
(a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause…and not 
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause,)211 Davis stated, “Congress could 
grant no such power [to establish military commissions]; and to the honor of our national 
legislature be it said, it has never been provoked by the state of the country even to 
attempt its exercise.”212  The question of Congressional authority to convene military 
commissions was not one of the issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case.  
Davis acknowledged at the beginning of his majority opinion that the controlling question 
in the case was whether the military commission had jurisdiction to try and sentence 
Milligan.  Yet, in his opinion, Davis went out of his way to declare that Congress could 
not constitutionally authorize the use of these tribunals even if it chose to do so.  
 The Supreme Court’s role in deciding whether a Congressional law was 
unconstitutional was first established by Chief Justice John Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck.  
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In this 1810 case, Justice Marshall cautioned that the act of declaring a Congressional law 
unconstitutional was “a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be 
decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case.”213  The Supreme Court, therefore, could 
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional only if there were no other grounds for ruling 
on the case in question.  Despite the fact that Justice Fields went to great lengths in 
pointing out that no question of Congressional authority was before the Court, the 
majority opinion nonetheless maintained that Congress could not constitutionally 
establish military commissions even if it had wanted to do so.          
 This obiter dicta statement was the spark that lit the fire of Radical Republican 
opprobrium for Davis’s majority opinion.  A more detailed analysis will be given in the 
next chapter regarding Congressional Reconstruction, but at this point it is only necessary 
to point out that Radicals would rely on military commissions in the South to protect 
freedmen from all-white juries and judges who obviously were not concerned about their 
civil and legal rights.  Upon reading that Davis had apparently struck down their ability to 
use military commissions in the South, they understandably felt attacked by the Court.   
But if Davis intended for Milligan to only apply in the North, and allow military 
commissions to remain in the South, why did he declare Congress unable to establish 
them?  A close reading of the opinion reveals that this obiter dicta statement was made in 
the context of the laws and usages of war being unconstitutional in those states that 
upheld the authority of the federal government and whose civilian courts were open and 
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functioning.  Executive use of military law where the authority of the federal government 
was unquestioned and where the courts were open and functioning WAS constitutional.  I 
contend, therefore, that while not stated as clearly as it could have been, Davis was trying 
to say that while neither Congress nor the Executive had the authority to establish 
military commissions in the North, he was leaving open the ability of Congress and not 
the Executive to establish military commissions in the South.   
A letter written by Davis to his brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, in 1867 may shed 
some light on Davis’s obiter dicta statement.  On February 24, Davis wrote: 
The right to try by a military tribunal was claimed as an 
executive power.  We held that the provisions of the 
constitution were irrepealably (sic) and could not be 
suspended.  Did it not logically follow that Congress could 
not repeal?  Believing as we did that the whole thing was 
fundamental, would it not at once have been unmanly and 
unworthy a court to have confirmed the denial to the 
executive and would it not at once have been claimed that 
we admitted Congress could do it?  How can a provision be 
irrepealable and yet Congress repeal it, disregard it, or 
suspend it? The whole argument, such as it is, is to show 
the irrepealable character of the amendments; nothing 
else.214   
  
Whether this was Davis’s actual logic at the time he drafted Milligan is uncertain.  Yet, if 
we take him at face value, Davis was simply stating that due to the Constitution’s 
inviolable nature, since the President could not authorize military commissions in the 
North, Congress could not either. Thus the Constitution is a law for all rulers and people.  
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But while it is misleading, even here Davis was NOT saying that Congress could note 
establish military commissions in the South.  In his letter to Rockwell, Davis continued, 
“I used the words ‘Congress could grant no such power’ in the wrong place, but in the 
subsequent part of the opinion I think I proved it.”215  While Davis was not specific as to 
what he meant here, nor did he explain where he should have placed it, a continued 
analysis of his majority opinion will show that he intended for Milligan to apply only to 
military commissions in the North. 
In rejecting Stanbery and Butler’s argument that martial law authorized the use of 
military commissions, Davis agreed with Garfield and Field’s arguments that no such 
proposition can stand under a republican government since martial law renders the 
military independent and superior to civil authority.  Yet, he acknowledged that the 
nation should not always expect to have “wise and humane” rulers.  “Wicked men, 
ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once 
occupied by Washington and Lincoln.”216  Davis argued that the Founders knew there 
would be times of war and that abuses of power were more likely to occur during these 
periods of calamities.  Therefore, they included certain safeguards that could not be 
disturbed, except for habeas corpus.  Davis recognized that during the Civil War there 
was an emergency that demanded the government should not be required to have 
produced the persons arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus.  “The Constitution 
goes no further.  It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he 
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shall be tried otherwise than by the course of the common law.”217  As he had stated 
earlier in rejection of Butler’s argument that Lincoln’s suspension of the writ justified the 
use of military commissions, Davis again emphatically stated that habeas corpus has 
nothing to do with the trial process.  It is simply an instrument to be used to determine the 
legality of one’s detention.  No mention is made of their trial outside of the normal civil 
judicial process when those civil courts are open.   
In adopting Garfield’s assertion that no military necessity was present in 
Milligan’s situation that justified martial law, Davis stated that martial law “cannot arise 
from a threatened invasion.  The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, 
such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”218  Davis went 
on to state that there are instances in which martial law may be established, specifically in 
foreign invasion or civil war, when the courts are actually closed, and where the theatre 
of active military operations exist.  “It is also confined to the locality of actual war.  
Because, during the late Rebellion it could have been enforced in Virginia, where the 
national authority was overturned and the courts driven out, it does not follow that it 
should obtain in Indiana.”219  Here, Davis clearly established his belief that martial law, 
the replacement of civilian law by military law, could be used in the South but not in the 
North.    
In closing, Davis admitted that if Milligan had been found guilty of the crimes 
imputed to him by a civilian court, he should have faced severe punishment.  For Davis 
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though, it was not easy for him to see how Milligan could have been treated as a prisoner 
of war, liable under the laws of war, “when he lived in Indiana for…twenty years, was 
arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of the states in 
rebellion.”220  The fact that he was accused of being involved in a plot, however 
improbable, to overthrow the government and establish an independent Northwestern 
Confederation, a plot that involved freeing Confederate soldiers and stealing weapons, 
did not make it a military manner.  In Davis’s mind, Milligan could not have pled the 
rights of war, for he was not engaged in acts of hostility against the federal government. 
A close reading of the majority opinion in Milligan thus sheds some light on 
where and for whom Davis intended it to apply.  His repeated emphasis that Milligan was 
not a “resident” of any “of the rebellious states” hints at the rule that residents of the 
South were enemies with no constitutional rights to protect them against military 
commissions.  This would fall in line with the Prize Cases decision, in which he was a 
member of the majority.  There, the Court held that all who lived in enemy territory, were 
no longer under the protection of the common law, but rather subject to the laws and 
usages of war (international law).  Additionally, Davis’s analysis of the locality of war 
seems to have made clear that military commission were permissible only in the South.               
Salmon P. Chase stated in his concurring opinion, that the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1863 proved Congress meant for civilians to be tried in civilian courts, not military 
courts, and therefore Milligan should have been released.  As stated previously, this act 
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allowed the detention of individuals only until a Grand Jury had met in the district where 
they were held and if they were not indicted by the Grand Jury, the act required their 
discharge.221  Chase also agreed with Davis that, “The holding of the Circuit and District 
Courts of the United States in Indiana had been uninterrupted. The administration of the 
laws in the Federal courts had remained unimpaired.”222  However, he disagreed with 
Davis’s obiter dicta statement.  Chase declared that Congress did in fact have the 
authority to convene such military trials of civilians, even though it had not tried to do so 
during the war.  In opposition to Davis, Chase’s opinion stated: 
In Indiana…the state was a military district, was the 
theater of military operations, had been actually 
invaded, and was constantly threatened with 
invasion.  We cannot doubt that, in such a time of 
public danger, Congress had power, under the 
Constitution, to provide for the organization of a 
military commission, and for trial by that 
commission of persons engaged in this conspiracy.  
The fact that the Federal courts were open was 
regarded by Congress as a sufficient reason for not 
exercising the power; but that fact could not deprive 
Congress of the right to exercise it.223           
 
  
As a Radical Republican himself, Chase disagreed with Davis’ contention that Congress 
did not possess the authority to establish military commissions.  Alongside other 
Radicals, he believed this stripping of Congressional power would be detrimental to 
Reconstruction.  At the end of his opinion, Chase remarked, “And we are unwilling to 
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give our assent by silence to expressions of opinion which seem to us calculated…to 
cripple the constitutional powers of the government, and to augment the public danger in 
times of invasion and rebellion.”224  Chase seems to have been extremely suspicious of 
Davis’s motivations when he used the word “calculated.” This may have inadvertently 
planted the seed for Radicals to view the majority opinion as a partisan attack on 
Reconstruction.  As we have seen through a close reading of the majority opinion, Davis 
did not intend for Milligan to remove the authority of military commissions in the South.  
On the surface, however, it is entirely understandable why Radicals interpreted his 
opinion negatively, in light of Davis’s swipe at congressional authority.      
Apart from the opinion itself, there is very little documentary evidence as to Judge 
Davis’ thoughts in regards to Milligan. The David Davis papers are incomplete, 
especially for 1866, the year Milligan was decided.  In fact, there are only a few known 
family letters that even mention the Supreme Court case.  On October 5, 1866, Sarah 
Davis wrote a letter to her son, George Perrin Davis, and mentioned that his father “was 
quite absorbed in his opinion…O, how I hope it may be finished tomorrow-for you dear 
Father is quite worn-and dreams of it at night.”225  His wife even saw how important the 
case was for him.  On January 14, 1867, Mrs. Davis wrote her husband, informing him of 
how “[T]he Pantagraph talks so harshly of the “Milligan case” and the decision of the 
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five Judges that I will not send it.”226  The Republican-leaning Pantagraph had taken 
exception to Milligan: 
We do not complain of the court for having decided to 
discharge Milligan; for after having determined that 
military law did not prevail in Indiana at the time of his 
arrest, and that he was therefore entitled to the benefit of 
the statute, they could do no less.  But with Chief Justice 
Chase, we think the court should have stopped there, and 
not volunteered opinions which give alarm to all but rebels 
and their sympathizers.227  
It seems as if the writer of this article was confused as to who made the obiter dita 
statement.  As we will see in a moment, according to Republicans it was Davis who 
“volunteered opinions” that comforted “rebels and their sympathizers.”  But in addition 
to this, we will also see that public opinion in regards to Milligan varied along the 
political spectrum.     
On January 30, 1867, Judge Davis wrote his wife, alluding to the public reaction 
to the published opinion.  “Having been attacked so much in the papers, I thought that 
Judge Rockwell would have written me.  The opinion is not much talked of now…its fate 
must depend on the judicial mind of the country.”228  Yet, as we have seen, we do know 
that throughout the Civil War, Judge Davis was adamantly against the use of military 
commissions in the North.  In an 1866 letter to Williams Herndon, Davis remarked, “Mr. 
Lincoln was advised and I so advised him, that the various military trials in the Northern 
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and Border States, where the Courts were free and untrammeled, were unconstitutional 
and wrong.”229   
One can view Davis’s majority opinion in more than one light.  On one hand, 
Davis took an extreme Copperhead position when he struck down military commissions 
in the North and upheld the Bill of Rights over the laws and usages of war.  It is also 
important to remember that throughout the war, Davis intervened on behalf of several 
Copperheads.  On the other hand, Davis held to his Whig roots and upheld the rule of law 
in his majority opinion.  As stated before, Lincoln believed that the exigencies of the 
rebellion clothed him in enormous war powers in order to preserve the Union.  Davis, 
however, while upholding the majority of Lincoln’s war-time actions, believed that the 
Constitution and the laws of the nation should have been upheld at all costs, thus his 
opposition to military commissions in the North.  Milligan can also be seen as a reflection 
upon Davis’s anti-Partyism and his growing dislike of politics in general.  As we have 
seen, despite his opposition to Peace Democrats, he consistently intervened on their 
behalf.   
Davis’s mindset at this time is important to note, in order to frame his continued 
judicial impartiality while on the bench.  Before oral argument in Milligan, he wrote a 
letter to his son stating, “I devote myself wholly to the duties of the bench and don’t 
mingle with politicians at all.”230  A few months after oral argument, Davis wrote to 
Julius Rockwell saying, “American politics don’t interest me much nowadays & I hardly 
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read the newspapers enough to keep up with the current news of the day.”231  These two 
letters illustrate Davis’s frame of mind before hearing Milligan and shortly before 
drafting his majority opinion.  It is my contention, therefore, that Davis remained 
politically restrained during the course of Lambdin P. Milligan’s case.       
As discussed in chapter 1, Davis was a Whig for most of his life.  Whigs were 
known for holding the opinion that the Constitution provided broad powers to the federal 
government, including the creation of a national bank and funding the construction of 
canals, roads, and railroads.232  Why then, did he in Milligan not only take a swipe at 
executive wartime power but congressional power as well?  After all, President Lincoln, 
who also spent most of his life as a Whig, took no issue with the broad powers he 
exercised during the war.  The lack of documentary evidence in regard to Davis and 
Milligan do nothing to help answer this question.  Therefore, I offer the following 
conjecture.  As prairie lawyers, both Lincoln and Davis rarely encountered cases that 
dealt with the United States Constitution.  The majority of their practice encompassed the 
common law and for Davis consisted largely of collection cases.  Davis had not even 
argued one single appellate case as opposed to Lincoln’s countless appellate cases.233  As 
Mark Neely points out, even as president, Lincoln “rarely thought abstractly about the 
Constitution and the laws…and did not characteristically reach first for a copy of the U.S. 
Constitution when confronted with a political or social problem…because thinking in 
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constitutional ways did not come naturally to him.”234  Davis, on the other hand, was 
forced to become better acquainted with constitutional ways when he ascended to the 
Supreme Court.  His increasing breadth of constitutional history and principles, while a 
justice, may have affected the Milligan decision’s legally liberal nature.       
Other jurists saw Davis’ opinion as detrimental to post-war policy.  Attorney John 
Jay, grandson of Chief Justice John Jay, wrote to Chase stating, “If, as the public begin to 
fear, [the Court’s] denial of the powers of Congress is any index to the view they are 
prepared to take of the great questions that will come before them in reference to 
Reconstruction, our situation is certainly a grave one.”235 Jay not only feared the short 
term consequences of Milligan, but the long term decision-making by the Court in 
regards to Reconstruction as well.  If military commissions in the South were being 
struck down, in his view, would the Court likewise strike down other Reconstruction 
provisions?  Again, we will see in the next chapter, that Davis actually upheld 
Reconstruction measures in the South.   
Democrats and Democratic newspapers, of course, immediately praised Davis’s 
opinion.  The New York World exclaimed, “The fact that the Supreme Court has escaped 
the servile contamination of the times, and pronounces an independent opinion which 
vindicates a party so traduced and maligned as the Democracy, is full of 
encouragement.”236  The Enquirer wrote, “It has been decided by the Court that Congress 
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has no power to authorize military commissions.  The upright action of the Supreme 
Court has inspired the country with new hope of a speedy tranquilization.”237  The Little 
Rock Arkansas Gazette said that Milligan “encourages the belief that the Supreme Court 
would become a barrier to the sweeping progress of a ruthless fanaticism.”238  Even some 
Republican newspapers praised the opinion.  The Louisville Democrat exclaimed, “that in 
the worst days of party insanity and misrule, there is one conservative department of the 
Government unawed and uninfluenced by the arbitrary power of Jacobinism.  It is said 
the Radicals, of the legal persuasion, grow sick at heart when they contemplate the 
decision.”239  The New Orleans Picayune hailed the decision in almost Biblical 
proportions. “This emerging of the Supreme Court above the atmosphere of partisan 
strifes and tumultuous popular passions into the region of calm and unclouded justice is 
the rising above the waters of the Ararat, on which the ark of the constitution may repose 
in security.”240  The Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican saw Milligan as nothing 
more than “a reaffirmation of the sacred right of trial by jury,” and it condemned 
“popular alarm or partisan animosity.”241  The Democratic papers read Milligan as far 
more sweeping as it actually was.  For them, Democrats thought that no military 
commissions would be allowed.  Republicans also misread Davis’s opinion but in a 
negative rather than a positive light.  In their minds, there would be no military 
commissions in the South to protect freedmen’s rights.       
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No other historian has more accurately captured the contrasting responses to 
Milligan between modern day legal scholars and Radical Republicans after it was 
published than Charles Warren. In his 1935 book The Supreme Court in United States 
History, Warren observed:  
This famous decision has been long recognized as one of 
the bulwarks of American liberty, that it is difficult to 
realize now the storm of invective and opprobrium which 
burst upon the Court at the time when it was first made 
public.  By the Reconstructionists the decision was 
regarded as a reversion to the theory of constitutional 
law…and they asserted that the Court had now joined 
hands with President Johnson in an effort to destroy the 
Congressional plans for Reconstruction.242    
 
 
The Congressional plans for Reconstruction, of course, were to establish and protect civil 
and political rights for freedmen throughout the South.  Ironically misreading the 
decision, Radical newspapers and politicians alike reviled Davis’s apparent attack on 
their vision for a post-war South.                                  
Much like John Jay, The Nation, a New York, Republican-leaning weekly 
magazine, saw Milligan as an attack on Reconstruction and what he saw as legal 
consequences for freedmen in the South.  “Courts such as now exist in the South are no 
more protection to the freedmen than if they did not exist.”243  Jay and The Nation 
obviously understood that all-white, local Southern courts were not to be relied upon to 
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uphold civil and legal rights for freedmen.  The American Law Review opined on Davis’s 
obiter dicta statement: 
Had [the Court] in truth simply adhered to their plain duty 
as Judges, they could have united in one opinion on this 
most important case.  Instead of approaching the subject of 
the powers of the coordinate branches of the government as 
one of great delicacy…they seemed eager to go beyond the 
record…the more a case before the Supreme Court assumes 
a political aspect, the more cautious should the Judges be to 
confine themselves within their proper limits…244    
          
The American Law Review clearly saw Davis’s opinion as a political 
attack on Congressional Reconstruction.    
The Republican New York Times stated: 
The Supreme Court, we regret to find, throws the great 
weight of its influence into the scale of those who assailed 
the Union and step and step impugned the constitutionality 
of nearly everything that was done to uphold it.  The whole 
Copperhead press exults over the decision.245  
 
It is not clear whether the Times thought that Davis was taking the side of 
the South or Peace Democrats.  Either way, they accurately depicted the 
Peace Democrat rapture over the decision.     
Harper’s Weekly, which supported the Lincoln administration during the war, 
wrote, “Like the Dred Scott decision, it is not a judicial opinion-it is a political act.  The 
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Indiana decision operates to deprive the freedmen in the late rebel States, whose laws 
grievously outrage them, of the protection of the freedmen’s courts.”246  This Republican 
newspaper probably comes the closest to representing how Radicals viewed Davis’s 
majority opinion.  Without military commissions (freedmen’s courts) in the South, their 
newly acquired rights would be severely jeopardized.     
In respects to Davis’s obiter dicta statement about congressional authority, the 
Republican mouthpiece, Chicago Tribune stated, “Such a stepping aside from the case in 
hand was, we think, unnecessary, uncalled for and unwise, and will do much to revive the 
unfavorable impression of the tribunal.”247   
Radical public opinion perceived Davis’ majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan as 
a direct attack on Radical Republicans and their plans for Reconstruction in the South.  
Southern public opinion perceived the opinion as a blanket of protection from post-war 
military rule.  Northern Democrat public opinion said it was a vindication of military 
commissions such as in Milligan and Vallandigham’s cases.  All three ends of the 
political spectrum were wrong.  I contend it was simply not the case that Davis intended 
to limit Reconstruction in this way.  In a letter to his brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, 
Davis explained, “not a word is said in the opinion about reconstruction, & the power [to 
try by military commission] is conceded in the insurrectionary States.”248  It was not the 
use of military commissions in the South that Davis opposed, it was their use in the 
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North.  Unfortunately, the Radicals in Congress did not have the opportunity to read this 
letter and would, understandably, see Milligan as an attack on their plans for 
Reconstruction.  One could even make the argument that Davis was not accurately 
characterizing his own opinion.  However, as we will see in the next chapter, despite the 
Radical Republicans view and reaction to Milligan as an attack on Congressional 
Reconstruction, Davis’s voting record in subsequent Supreme Court cases allowed 
military commissions to remain intact in the Reconstruction South.   
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CHAPTER V 
“THE CONSTITUTIONAL TWADDLE OF MR. JUSTICE DAVIS”249: 
EX PARTE MILLIGAN AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Post-war reconciliation is invariably challenging, whatever the nature of the 
conflict. But it is exceptionally difficult in the aftermath of civil wars. Conflict over 
shared territory, a shared political system, or competing ideologies produces formidable 
ongoing problems regardless of whether civil war results in separation or reunion.  For 
the American Civil War, one of the post-war conflicts would be over David Davis’s 
majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan and its interpretation by Radical Republicans.250  In 
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order to understand the Radical reaction to Milligan it is necessary first to understand 
exactly what the role of military commissions were during Reconstruction.  This will 
allow a clearer understanding of why Radicals were so concerned over Davis’s reprimand 
of military commissions and why they understandably took action against the Supreme 
Court, leading to a more partisan and politically unstable environment during 
Reconstruction.        
Milligan was handed down in the aftermath of Lincoln’s assassination and in the 
early phases of Presidential Reconstruction.  As a driving issue, race eventually became a 
constitutional issue of Reconstruction.251  Radical Republicans, such as Thaddeus 
Stephens, argued that the Confederacy was an “enemy nation” and thus the laws of war 
dictated military occupation by Union troops.  Though they agreed with Stevens that the 
laws of war held between the armed forces of the Union so-called and those of the so-
called Confederacy.  Moderate Republicans, like President Lincoln, maintained that 
nevertheless, the Southern states had never left the Union thus entitling them to a full 
restoration of their political and legal rights, with the proviso of abolishing slavery, a 
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certain percentage taking a test oath, and several other conditions.252  Lincoln had 
consistently maintained that secession was illegal, and he could not very well hold it was 
legal now that the war was coming to an end.        
Initially, President Johnson favored leniency when it came to readmitting the 
Southern states.  Not only did he offer amnesty to southerners who took a loyalty oath, 
but he also allowed many former Confederates back into political office.  He did require 
the Southern states to ratify the 13th Amendment though.  This meant that the political 
rights of the freedmen would be left to Southern state governments.  “Black Codes” were 
quickly passed by Southern state legislatures which effectively restricted their political 
and economic rights by establishing a system of sharecropping and racial segregation.253  
As W.E.B. Dubois best described it, “The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the 
sun; then moved back again toward slavery.”254      
Radical and some moderate Republicans in Congress had alternative plans for 
Reconstruction.   Along with refusing to seat Southerners in their respective state 
governments, on April 9, 1866, three days after the Supreme Court decided Milligan, 
Congress passed the Civil Rights bill and on July 16, the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, both 
over Johnson’s veto.255  The Radicals also believed that military occupation and military 
law were the only mechanisms that could protect the freedmen’s newly acquired political 
rights.  In fact, a provision of the Freedman’s Bureau Act provided for military 
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commissions to protect the rights of Black in the South.256  In his famous “Swing ‘Round 
the Circle,” Johnson campaigned in support of his Reconstruction plan and lambasted 
Congress for attempting to destroy it.  Johnson’s actions made it seem to a majority of 
Northerners that winning the war was being given away.  As a result, the 1866 
congressional elections led to a landslide victory for Radicals, thus ending Presidential 
Reconstruction and ushering in Congressional Reconstruction.257 
A part of this military occupation was the use of military commissions to try 
Southern civilians.  Despite Milligan’s assertion that military commissions were 
unconstitutional when the civilian courts were open and functioning, military trials of 
civilians continued in the Reconstruction South.  Mark Neely provides the following 
number of trials per year after the Milligan decision:  229 in 1866, 181 in 1867, and 104 
in 1868.258  What happened here? It was by no means the first time that another branch of 
government ignored a Supreme Court decision.  Lincoln blatantly ignored the Taney 
Court on civil liberty issues in Ex parte Merryman.259   
Less well known are the justifications given by Congressional Radicals for 
ignoring Milligan after the war.  Understanding the partisanship in a post-Civil War 
America is vital to this story.  Michael W. Fitzgerald’s “Reconstruction Politics and the 
Politics of Reconstruction” explores how corruption and partisanship undermined the 
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effectiveness of the Reconstruction governments.260  The partisanship that Fitzgerald 
uncovers led Radicals to see Davis’s majority opinion as an attack on their plans for 
Reconstruction.  In doing so, Congress took several steps to reduce the power of the 
Supreme Court which only contributed to the political instability of Reconstruction.     
Justice Chase and his Radical Republican colleagues had strongly opposed 
President Lincoln’s Reconstruction policy of reuniting the United States.  In opposition to 
Lincoln’s 10% plan back in 1864, the Radicals proposed the Ironclad Oath which 
prevented anyone who had supported the Confederacy from voting in Southern elections.  
Lincoln quickly pocket-vetoed the Wade-Davis bill, which made southern state 
readmittance to the Union contingent on taking the Ironclad Oath itself.261  The Radicals 
continued to lobby for a more aggressive war effort, the end of slavery, and the total 
destruction of the Confederacy.  After the 1866 elections and after expelling the former 
Confederate Southern Congressmen in the 39th Congress they had a majority of nearly 3 
to 1 in the House, nearly 4 to 1 in the Senate, and took control of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction.  Johnson ignored this Radical sweep and continued to insist on Southern 
state re-admittance.  He called for a “return to the ancient landmarks” in order to assure 
“the perpetuity of our free institutions,” and a restoration of “fraternal feeling.”262  The 
only problem with this “perpetuity of our free institutions” was an underlying condition 
that freedmen be left to the mercy of local southern law.  Thus, there was a need (from 
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the Radical perspective) for judicial supervision in the South through the continued use of 
military commissions. 
The United States Army played a vital role during Reconstruction.  Their main 
purpose was to maintain law and order, as well as to protect freedmen and white 
Republicans from resentful, violent Southerners.  The horrendous acts of the Klu Klux 
Klan nearly turned the South into a terrorist state in which lynching and voter 
intimidation were prevalent.263  The task of putting the lid on this violence fell on the 
shoulders of the U.S. Army, with the assistance of the Freedmen’s Bureau.  Soldiers were 
inadequate to handle the work load however.  Two hundred-thousand troops were 
stationed in the South in 1865.  By April 1866, there were less than forty-thousand troops 
and in October 1866 only twenty-thousand.264  Maintaining the law proved just as 
challenging as maintaining order.  Thus military commissions were put into place so that 
law and order could be maintained.  From the end of the war until January 1, 1869, there 
were 1,435 military trials of civilians in the South.265  Northern Republicans such as 
Thaddeus Stevens saw these tribunals as the only option to maintain a fair justice system 
for blacks in the face of local Southern judges and juries, while Southerners viewed them 
as a continuation of Republican tyranny.266                   
We will see what would become an emerging constitutional conflict not only 
between the Radical Republicans and President Johnson but also between the Radical 
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Republicans and the Supreme Court, especially in response to David Davis’s majority 
opinion in Ex parte Milligan.  To be sure, based on his own racist tendencies Davis 
opposed such Radical Reconstruction ideas of black suffrage and equality.  Even though 
he labeled himself a Republican, he leaned conservative Republican at best.  Much later, 
in an 1868 letter to Massachusetts Republican Congressman Julius Rockwell, Judge 
Davis wrote, “The election last week passed off quietly but when I saw the degraded 
ignorance of the poor creatures, who were voting…I felt sad…Negro suffrage…may 
prove a measure of wisdom and good statesmanship, but I don’t believe it.”267  This 
tracks with what we have already seen with Davis’s racial prejudices.   
Just weeks before Davis issued his opinion in Ex parte Milligan, the election of 
1866 resulted in a landslide victory for Radical Republicans. Consequently, Milligan was 
just as important for freedmen as it was for white civil liberties.  Confident of their new 
majorities, the newly elected Radicals in Congress passed several pieces of legislation 
stripping the Supreme Court of its jurisdictional and appellate powers, in order to 
preserve their Reconstruction plans and to keep the Court at bay.  These attacks on the 
Supreme Court by Radical Republicans came out of their understanding of Milligan’s 
majority opinion which was that it struck down military commissions in Reconstruction 
South.     
The actions that the Radicals took in response to Milligan included reducing its 
members and limiting its appellate jurisdiction over military commissions in the South.  
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These actions only made Reconstruction’s politics more partisan.  In an almost prophetic 
manner regarding Davis’s obiter dicta statement about Congressional authority to 
establish military commissions, Radical Republican Congressman James F. Wilson of 
Iowa declared, “[T]his is a piece of judicial impertinence which we are not bound to 
respect.  No such question was before the record in treating of it.”268  The “question” that 
Wilson referred to was of course Davis’s obiter dicta statement.  The Congressman went 
on to explain that Milligan did not present any legal point that would justify Davis in 
examining the powers of Congress.    
The Radical Republicans immediately saw Milligan as a threat to their plans for 
Reconstruction.  According to a correspondent from the Newark Evening Courier: 
 Every Republican member of Congress with whom I have 
conferred on the subject is out and out for abolishing the 
Supreme Court at once upon the ground that if Congress 
does not abolish it, it will abolish Congress.  I find the 
decision of the whole court is as offensive to the 
Republicans of Congress as that of the majority.269   
 
In the minds of Radical Republicans, their fears were soon realized.  Once Davis’s 
opinion was published, President Johnson immediately ordered all trials of civilians by 
military commissions dismissed.  United States District Court Judge Hall similarly 
released four men convicted by a military commission in South Carolina.  The Radicals 
were no less distressed when Dr. Samuel Mudd, one of the Lincoln assassination 
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conspirators who had been convicted by a military commission, applied for a writ of 
habeas corpus to Chief Justice Chase.270  Even though Chase denied the application 
because he could not issue a writ outside of his own Circuit, the Radicals drafted a bill on 
January 3, 1867 that would repeal the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, “to prevent 
the Supreme Court from releasing and discharging the assassins of Mr. Lincoln and the 
conspirators to release the rebel prisoners [Milligan, et al.] at Camp Douglas in 
Chicago.”271   
Debate over this bill and subsequent bills regarding military reconstruction during 
the 39th Congress often directly addressed Davis’s opinion.  Senator Reverdy Johnson 
defended the Court by stating, “The opinion of the majority was given by a man whose 
character, public and private, stands beyond possible reproach.”272  In response, leading 
Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens declared Milligan to be a “most injurious decision 
[that] has rendered immediate action by Congress upon the question of the establishment 
of governments in the rebel States absolutely indispensable.”273  Stevens went on to 
reason that Davis’s decision effectively took away every legal protection for loyal 
persons, black or white, who resided in the South.  Radical Congressman John A. 
Bingham of Ohio suggested, “sweeping away at once the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 
all cases.”274  While these heated debates continued over repealing the Habeas Corpus 
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Act of 1863, the New York Herald opined, “This bill, if passed into a law, will practically 
relieve the Supreme Court of any further interference with Congress in the business of 
Southern Reconstruction.”275  In the end, the bill to repeal the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 
did not receive enough support, even among moderate Republicans.  The Radicals, 
however, were not deterred in their effort to push back on a perceived threat from the 
Supreme Court.   
The next Radical foray against the Supreme Court was reducing the number of 
justices on the bench through the Act of July 23, 1866.  The number of justices on the 
Court was originally fixed at six in 1789, had been increased to seven in 1807, to nine in 
1837, and to ten by 1863.  Having suffered through illness all of the December term, 
Justice Catron died in May 1865.  As a result of the Act, President Johnson did not make 
a nomination to fill his seat before the next term.  Radical Republican James F. Wilson of 
Iowa, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, introduced H.R. 334 on February 26, 1866 
which, if adopted, would fix the number of justices on the Court at eight members.276  
Congressman Wilson commented, “I know that some of the members of that court are 
confirmed in that opinion that the court is too large.  I should be in favor myself…of still 
further reducing the number if another vacancy now existed.”277  Wilson did not make it 
clear which justices shared in his view that the court was too large, but one may 
conjecture that Chase and his Republican colleagues feared whomever Johnson might 
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appoint.  Without any debate, the House unanimously voted to send H.R. 334 to the 
Senate where on March 8th the bill was placed into the hands of the Judiciary Committee 
for three months.278  
On July 10th, Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull from Illinois reported an 
amendment that would reduce the Court to seven members.  The amended bill was passed 
and sent back to the House.279  On July 18, The House agreed on the amendment and the 
bill was passed, 78 Republican votes to 41 Democrat votes.280  The final version read, 
“No vacancy in the office of associate justice of the supreme court shall be filled by 
appointment until the number of associate justices shall be reduced to six; and thereafter 
the said supreme court shall consist of a chief justice of the United States Supreme and 
six associate justices.”281   
This attack, of course, effectively prevented President Johnson from appointing 
any justices to the Supreme Court who would have tended to uphold his Reconstruction 
policy of returning political power to the Southern states.  Even Justice Davis noted the 
Republicans’ motivations behind the bill.  In a letter to his brother-in-law Julius Rockwell 
he wrote, “But I have supposed the bill was passed simply to prevent the Presdt fr (sic) 
appointing Supreme Judges.”282  Interestingly enough, Johnson nominated Henry 
Stanbery to take Justice Catron’s place on April 16th.  While working in the Attorney 
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General’s office, Stanbery actually had written Johnson’s March 27 veto of the Civil 
Rights Bill, a bill which defined U.S. citizenship and affirmed that all citizens were 
equally protected under the law.283  The Radicals knew how disastrous his confirmation 
would be to their own Reconstruction plans, and thus let the Stanbery nomination 
stagnate in the Senate until the Act of July 23 was passed, eliminating this possible threat.  
However, as Charles Fairman points out in History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Reconstruction and Reunion: 
As an expedient to preclude appointments by President 
Johnson, the reduction of seven was unnecessary.  In a 
Senate where the Republicans strength was well over twice 
that of Democrats and Johnson’s friends combined, 
confirmation of any unsatisfactory nominee could be 
prevented.284    
 
Even though reducing the number of justices on the Supreme Court was unnecessary 
based on the Republicans’ ability to deny confirmation, it is again understandable why 
the Radicals took these measures.  But this was not yet enough to protect freedmen in the 
South from all white juries and judges.       
Leading Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens commented on Milligan in 
January 1867, saying, “That decision although in terms not as infamous as the Dred Scott 
decision, is yet far more dangerous in its operation upon the lives and liberties of the 
loyal men of this country.”285  In order to protect those lives and liberties of Unionists 
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and freedmen, Stevens introduced H.R. 1143 in January 1867 for the creation of “military 
districts…to give protection, to suppress disorder, and to cause criminals to be punished-
by the local courts or, if he judged necessary, by military commission.”286  Stevens 
introduced this bill based on his belief in the power of conquerors under the law of 
nations.  Radical Republican Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan believed that the 
laws of war had given Lincoln the authority to appoint military governors during the war 
and concluded that those same laws of war gave Congress the power to reorganize the 
former Confederate states.287   
Kentucky Democrat Lawrence S. Trimble objected to such measures.  Referring 
to Milligan, which at this point had been decided the previous year, he prayed that the 
Court might “continue…as the shield and protector of the weak and the innocent through 
all time.”288  In his mind, the “weak and the innocent” were white southerners.  Elijah 
Hise, also a Democrat from Kentucky, stated that the “only hope of the preservation of a 
free Government is in the decisions of the Supreme Court.”289  Charles Eldridge of 
Wisconsin said that Milligan had brought “glad tidings to the depressed and despairing 
people.”290  Frederick Pike of Maine supported the Steven’s bill, insisting that Congress 
should set up new governments in the South.  However, he “noticed that a decision 
[Milligan] is threatened against such action.  But the court should recollect that it has had 
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bad luck with its political decisions.  The people thus far have preferred to govern the 
country themselves and let the court attend to its law business.”291  It seems that Pike, like 
many of his Radical colleagues, also thought of Davis’s majority opinion as a political 
maneuver to take away Congress’s ability to set up military rule in the South.  Ironically 
for Davis, as he saw it, he was in fact attending to “law business” rather than issuing a 
political decision.         
On the very last day of the 39th Congress, March 2, 1867, Steven’s bill was passed 
over Johnson’s veto.  The first of four Reconstruction Acts, it divided the ten former 
Confederate states into five military districts and laid out the conditions for which their 
representatives would be re-admitted to Congress.  One such condition included the 
ratification of the 14th Amendment and passage of new state constitutions that 
incorporated the right to vote.  It also laid the framework for military commissions.292  It 
appears then that the Radicals thought they were responding to Milligan’s attempt at 
curtailing what they saw as their constitutionally granted authority to establish order in 
the former rebel states and most importantly ensure the safety and liberty of freedmen.  
By legislating military commissions in both the Freedman’s Bureau Act and Military 
Reconstruction Act in response to Milligan and reducing the number of justices to 
prevent Johnson from appointing anyone who might be opposed to Congressional 
Reconstruction, the Radicals took extreme but understandable measures in order to 
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protect freedmen from an all-white Southern judicial system that would most assuredly 
be opposed toward their newly acquired rights.        
One particularly prominent military commission that occurred under the First 
Reconstruction Act took place in November 1867, about a year after Davis released his 
opinion.  William McCardle, the editor of the Vicksburg Times, was tried by a military 
commission for inciting insurrection and urging white southerners to “resist despotism 
and despots” and to maintain “the rights of the people who were born free.”293  On 
November 6, he threatened to publish the names of anyone who planned to vote in the 
elections under the state’s Reconstruction laws.  Four charges were issued against him: 
(1) disturbance of the public peace in violation of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867, 
(2) inciting insurrection, disorder, and violence, (3) libel, and (4) impeding reconstruction 
of the Southern states.  Upon his arrest, McCardle filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Circuit Court of the Southern District of Mississippi.  Believing that the Military 
Reconstruction Act of March 2, which authorized cases to be brought before a military 
commission instead of a judge or jury, negated his authority to try McCardle, the judge 
remanded him back into military custody on November 25.  McCardle appealed to the 
Supreme Court on December 23, 1867.  Certiorari was granted and arguments were 
scheduled for the first Monday in March 1868 and spanned March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 9th.294  
McCardle’s appeal relied on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 which, ironically, granted 
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appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review habeas corpus cases where former 
slaves were being held illegally.295   
Fearing that the Supreme Court would declare the Reconstruction Act 
unconstitutional, the Radicals hurried a bill through while the Court took the case under 
advisement on March 9.  The Act of March 27, 1868 stated, “The act approved February 
5, 1867, entitled 'An act to amend an act to establish the judicial courts of the United 
States, approved September 24, 1789, as authorized an appeal from the judgment of the 
Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such 
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court, on appeals which have been, or may hereafter be 
taken, be, and the same is hereby repealed. "296  This action by the Radicals, in effect, 
revoked the Court’s authority to review McCardle’s case.      
Stepping back briefly, the opening of the second session of the 40th Congress saw 
significant Radical activity towards the Court.  Representative John Bingham of Ohio 
introduced a measure on January 13, 1868 that required the vote of two-thirds of the full 
Court to invalidate an Act of Congress.  Bingham concluded that the Court had “dared to 
descend from its high place in the discussion and decision of purely judicial questions to 
the settlement of political questions which it has no more right to decide for the American 
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people than has the Court of St. Petersburg.”297  It is obvious that Davis’s obiter dicta 
statement in Milligan greatly concerned the gentleman from Ohio.  For him, the ability of 
the Supreme Court to hold a Congressional act unconstitutional was much too easy, as 
illustrated by Davis’s statement regarding Congressional authority to establish military 
commissions.  The bill briefly remained in the Senate but soon was forgotten due to 
Andrew Johnson’s impeachment.  
Republican Lyman Trumbull introduced S. 163 on December 4, 1867, which 
called for five Justices instead of six that would suffice for a quorum.298  The House 
Judiciary Committee adopted Bingham’s measure requiring a two-thirds majority vote to 
have an Act of Congress declared unconstitutional.  This, however, only gained the 
support of twenty-five Radicals.  The bill was defeated 116 to 39.299  Another bill was 
introduced by Radical George Williams of Oregon, one that would this time curb the 
Supreme Court.  S. 213 started out as a bill to amend the Judiciary Act by allowing the 
Supreme Court to review cases under the internal revenue laws.300  When it reached the 
House, Radical Republican James F. Wilson added an amendment that repealed the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.301  Back in the Senate, it was passed 32 to 6.302  The bill was 
passed over President Johnson’s veto on March 27, 1868.303                 
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Because Chief Justice Chase concluded that Congress had complete constitutional 
authority to regulate the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction even though the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867 lawfully allowed McCardle’s appeal, Ex parte McCardle was unanimously 
dismissed on April 12 before an opinion could be rendered.  In their minds, the Radical 
Republicans had gained yet another victory in a range war with the Supreme Court and 
successfully protected their military apparatus for the preservation of black equality 
before the law in the new South.   
But as this thesis has contended all along, David Davis did not intend for Milligan 
to strike down military commissions in the Reconstruction South.  Exactly what were 
Judge Davis’ thoughts on Reconstruction in the context of Milligan?  Again, 
documentary evidence in the form of correspondence or diaries is inconclusive.  The only 
exception is the February 27th letter to his brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, in which 
Davis explained, “not a word is said in the opinion about reconstruction, & the power [to 
try by military commission] is conceded in the insurrectionary States.”304  Using this 
letter as proof of Davis’ thoughts on Reconstruction could be somewhat precarious 
however.  Corroborating evidence for his stance on Reconstruction, therefore, may be 
found in Supreme Court decisions that followed Milligan.   
After Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867, the state of 
Mississippi petitioned the Supreme Court for an injunction to prevent President Johnson 
from enforcing it.  In Mississippi v. Johnson, the Court unanimously stated that it did not 
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possess the authority to interfere with the President’s constitutional duty of executing the 
laws of Congress: “Neither [Congress or the President] can be restrained in its action by 
the judicial departments; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, 
subject to its cognizance.”305  In other words, according to the Court, it could not tell the 
President how to prospectively perform his executive duties, but it could review the acts 
stemming from his executive duties after they were performed.     
The following month, the states of Georgia and Mississippi, again in an attempt to 
curb the Reconstruction Act, filed suit against Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for 
injunctive relief.  As with Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court unanimously 
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction to decide a political issue.  The cases brought 
before the Court did not involve questions of persons or property but rather a political 
question of whether the federal government could dissolve a state government and 
replace it with a new one prescribed under military rule.  “That these matters, both as 
stated in the body of the bill, and, in the prayers for relief, call for the judgment of the 
court upon political questions, and, upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a 
political character, will hardly be denied.”306  This ruling, of which Davis was a part of, is 
entirely consistent with the central argument of this thesis.  It shows that (1) Davis upheld 
military commissions in the South within the Reconstruction Act, which was being 
challenged in this case and (2) by refusing to hear a case involving a political question, he 
continued to maintain a nonpartisan mindset while on the bench.       
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It seems obvious that Milligan’s reception would fall along party lines.  
Democrats praised Davis’s majority opinion for its defense of civil liberties during 
wartime.  Radical Republicans on the other hand did not see it that way.  For them, their 
most important instrument in protecting freedmen in the post-war South had just been 
struck down by a Supreme Court Justice that had spent the war intervening on behalf of 
anti-Black, Southern sympathizers.  This thesis, however, has argued that Davis’s 
wartime record of intervening on behalf of Copperheads who were being tried by the 
military in the North while at the same time supporting the war effort in the South, 
together with his February 27, 1867 letter to Julius Rockwell and the Court’s unanimous 
rejection to review military commissions in Ex parte McCardle, Mississippi v. Johnson, 
and Georgia v. Stanton reveals that Davis did not intend for Milligan to apply to the 
South.  While he himself shared many of the same racial prejudices as Copperheads, he 
wholly believed in the Union and equally believed that the law should be applied to those 
who supported the war and to those who opposed it.  Most importantly, his judicial 
impartiality in Ex parte Milligan, despite his own racial prejudices, left military 
commissions in the South intact.          
David Davis served on the Supreme Court until 1877.  A year before, Rutherford 
B. Hayes, Republican Governor from Ohio ran against Samuel Tilden, the Democratic 
Governor of New York.  Several voting irregularities occurred throughout the country 
during the fall election which resulted in a disputed single vote in the Electoral College.  
In order to remedy the brewing Constitutional crisis, Congress appointed a fifteen-
member Electoral Commission to resolve the disputed vote.  Davis was appointed as the 
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only Independent member which would give him the deciding vote.  Never in the history 
of the United States had one individual been given the opportunity to choose a president.  
On January 18, 1877, the Illinois legislature elected Davis to the United States Senate 
with every single Democrat vote and absolutely no Republican vote.  The Democrats’ 
ploy to gain Davis’s vote backfired.  Refusing to sit on the Commission and make a 
decision, Justice Joseph Bradley took Davis’s place and gave the election to Hayes.307       
On March 5, 1877, the same day Hayes was inaugurated, Davis resigned from the 
Supreme Court and took the oath as United States Senator.  Davis’s most lasting impact 
as a Senator was in judicial reform.  He wrote a bill to create a Federal Circuit Courts of 
Appeal.  This would effectively relieve the Supreme Court from its burdensome caseload, 
of which he was intimately familiar with.  The bill was passed in the Senate but failed in 
the House.  On July 2, 1881, President Garfield was mortally shot by a disgruntled 
officer-seeker.  Two months later, the president succumbed to his wounds and died.  
Vice-President Chester A. Arthur assumed the Presidency, leaving the Senate president’s 
seat vacant.  Ironically, Davis who had been elected to the Senate unanimously by 
Democrats, was unanimously elected president pro tempore by Republicans.  As the 
leader of the Senate he was well liked by both sides of the isles as he remained politically 
neutral, much like he had been on the Supreme Court.308   
When his term was up, Davis did not seek reelection.  In March of 1883, he 
retired from the Senate and returned to his home in Bloomington, Illinois.  Davis’s 
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remaining years were fairly quiet.  In 1884 he was elected president of the Illinois State 
Bar Association and in November of 1885 delivered the eulogy for John Stuart, an old 8th 
Circuit colleague of his and Lincoln.  Shortly after delivering this address, Davis fell 
gravely ill.  It was only then that doctors finally realized that the disease he had been 
battling for so many years was diabetes.  His condition progressively worsened over the 
spring and on June 20 Davis slipped into a coma.  He remained alive but unconscious 
until June 26, 1886, when he died.  Four days later, six pallbearers including Robert Todd 
Lincoln and Adlai E. Stevenson, carried Davis’s body to Evergreen Cemetery.  The 
church bells of Bloomington rang out in honor of the jurist and statesman.309             
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
“The pen that writes the judgment of the Court, will be mightier  
for good or for evil than any sword that ever was  
wielded by mortal arm.”310 
 
When David Davis returned to his home in Bloomington, Illinois during the 
summer of 1866 to write his majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan, he was well aware of 
its legal significance.  Milligan’s historical significance was yet to be written by 
historians however.  This study has attempted to examine the latter, specifically in 
regards to Civil War and Reconstruction politics. I have argued that the relevancy and 
historical importance of Ex parte Milligan is not in the opinion itself, but rather in its 
interpretation by Radical Republicans and how it was the pinnacle of Davis’s maturation 
as a civil libertarian.  The Radical Republican view that Milligan voided military 
commissions in the South led the Radicals in Congress to launch several attacks against 
the Supreme Court, thus reflecting and contributing to the existing partisanship of 
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Reconstruction.  Yet, as the events of Reconstruction played out, their actions were 
certainly justified.      
David Davis’s early life as a Whig instilled in him an opposition to partisan 
politics which he carried with him for the rest of his life.  Yet he managed Lincoln’s 
campaign in 1860 and was a fervent Whig state legislator.  On the other hand, as a circuit 
court judge and Supreme Court justice, he was a constant guardian of the law and justice 
for all, regardless of party affiliation.  From this perspective, we can see two different 
sides to Davis.  He was an avid partisan politician off the bench but was a model of 
judicial impartiality when on the bench.  As a Supreme Court justice, Davis became 
increasingly concerned with the growing civil liberties issues during the Civil War, 
specifically in the North.  On several occasions Davis directly intervened on behalf of 
Peace Democrats who faced trial by military commissions.  Among those were the 
defendants in the Charleston, Illinois riots and Chicago Times editor Wilber Storey.  In 
addition, Davis personally shared his concerns with Lincoln, warning him of the dubious 
nature of military commissions in the North.  But while adamantly opposed to Lincoln’s 
actions in the North, he consistently upheld his actions in the South as seen in the Prize 
Cases.  Davis’s opposition to the Emancipation Proclamation can be explained by his 
racial prejudices but could also be used to argue that he was predisposed to strike down 
military commissions in the South.  As we have seen, Davis chose to show judicial 
impartiality by setting aside his racial prejudices and leaving military courts intact as a 
legal safeguard for freedmen.        
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With the war finally over, Ex parte Milligan offered Davis a chance to finally 
make a lasting statement on the legality of military commissions in the North.  Davis’s 
majority opinion was just that: a referendum on military trials of civilians in the North.  
Throughout the opinion, as he had during the war, Davis upheld the Lincoln 
administration’s war effort in the rebellious states.  He made a clear distinction between 
North and South in this manner.  According to Davis’s view, Indiana was not in a state of 
war that justified martial law and therefore did not justify the use of military 
commissions.  This point, of course, could be an entire thesis study unto itself. 
Nonetheless, Davis went on to make an obiter dicta statement saying that even if 
Congress had authorized these military commissions in the North, they did not have 
Constitutional power to do so.  It was therefore understandable that Radicals saw Davis’s 
opinion as an attack on Radical Reconstruction policy, specifically in regards to using 
military commissions as a safeguard for freedmen’s legal rights.  We can also understand 
why it was that Radicals thought it necessary to reduce the number of justices on the 
Court and strip it of its jurisdictional powers to hear military commission cases.     
If Milligan holds any lesson for us today, it is a political lesson rather than a legal 
lesson.  This political lesson does not come from the Radicals though.  Again, one can 
certainly understand why they viewed Milligan the way they did.  If they thought that 
military commissions in the South were being struck down by the Supreme Court, their 
ability to protect freedmen’s rights in a post-war Southern justice system would have 
been severely jeopardized.  In other words, the lack of military commissions meant 
freedmen would surely have been at the mercy of all-white courts.  To label the Radical’s 
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attacks on the Supreme Court in the aftermath of Milligan, then, is to diminish and 
undermine their concerns and goals of racial equality in Reconstruction South.   
For purposes of this study, therefore, the lesson lies with David Davis himself.  
To be sure, Davis showed great judicial impartiality in his majority opinion.  Considering 
his own racial prejudices, his opposition to emancipation and black equality, and to 
Radical Republicans, he very well could have extended his condemnation of military 
commissions into the South; yet he did not.  He strongly opposed Peace Democrats as 
well, yet he consistently took up the cause of Peace Democrats, such as Lambdin P. 
Milligan, whose civil liberties, he held, were violated during the war.  Davis was able to 
set aside the same partisan politics he had loathed his entire life and rule on his legal 
convictions.   
It would be naïve to think that judges do not come to the bench without their own 
personal political persuasions and that those political persuasions do not enter into their 
minds as they consider the cases before them.  In 2000, Bush v. Gore saw the Supreme 
Court vote down strictly party lines, effectively ushering in arguably one of the most 
economically and diplomatically devastating administrations in United States history.  
More recently, arguments over Justice Scalia’s replacement have revolved around party 
politics rather than substantive judicial qualifications.  As it turns out, President Obama’s 
nominee to replace Justice Scalia understands the importance of being both a statesman 
and jurist.  During a press conference at the White House on March 16, nominee Judge 
Merrick Garland stated, “The life of public service is as much a gift to the person who 
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serves as it is to those he is serving.”311 Long before Judge Garland made this statement, 
Judge Davis lived it.         
In short, members of the judiciary, at all levels, should take care not to allow their 
political ideologies to overshadow the pursuit of justice.  In a world of injustice and toxic 
partisanship, the judicial system can and should be a great equalizer, but we must first 
seek to re-instill a sense of public service, not only among those who interpret the law but 
those who make the law.  Until then, David Davis’s life and judicial career stands as an 
example of wisdom and statesmanship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
311 Judge Merrick Garland, “President Obama Supreme Court Nomination Announcement,”  
http://www.c-span.org/video/?406805-1/president-obama-supreme-court-nomination-announcement. 
  
145 
 
REFERENCES 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
Government Documents and Statutes   
An Act amendatory of "An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An Act relating to Habeas 
Corpus, and regulating judicial Proceedings in certain Cases,'" approved May 
eleventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six. U.S. Statues at Large 385 (1867).  
 
An Act Amending the Judiciary by “Giving the Right of Appeal to the Supreme Court to 
Persons from Erroneous Decisions of Inferior Judicial Courts. U.S. Statutes at 
Large 44 (1868).     
 
An Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government of the Armies of the 
United States. U.S. Statues at Large 371 (1806).   
 
An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases. 
U.S. Statutes at Large 755 (1863).   
 
An Act to amend an act entitled “An act to establish a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen 
and Refugees,” and for other purposes. U.S. Statutes at Large 173 (1866).  
An Act to amend the Judicial System of the United States. U.S. Statutes at Large 156 
(1802).  
 
An Act to fix the Number of Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to 
change certain Judicial Circuits. U.S. Statutes at Large 209 (1866).  
 
An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States. U.S. Statutes at 
Large 428 (1867).   
 
An Act to recognize and adapt to the Constitution of the United States, the establishment 
of the troops raised under the resolves of the United States, in Congress 
assembled.  U.S. Statutes at Large 96 (1789). 
 
Black, Jeramiah S. “Argument of Jeremiah S. Black for the Petitioner.” 1866.  In Samuel 
The Milligan Case, edited by Samuel Klaus, New York: Knopf, 1929.  
 
  
146 
 
Bush, George W.  Military Order.  “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.”  Federal Register 68, no. 57 (November 
16, 2001): 833.   
 
Butler, Benjamin F. “Reply of Benjamin F. Butler for the United States.” Quoted in 
Samuel Klaus, ed. The Milligan Case. New York: Knopf, 1929.  
 
 
Field, David Dudley. “Argument of David Dudley Field for the Petitioner.” Quoted in 
Samuel Klaus, ed. The Milligan Case. New York: Knopf, 1929.  
 
 
Garfield, James Abram. “Argument of James Abram Garfield for the Petitioner.” Quoted 
in Samuel Klaus ed. The Milligan Case. New York: Knopf, 1929.  
 
Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General.  Washington: National Archives 
and Records Administration, 1861-1870.   
 
Lincoln, Abraham.  Military Order.  “General Orders No. 104.” (August 13, 1862). 
Quoted in Mark Neely, Jr. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil 
Liberties. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.  
 
Lincoln, Abraham.  Military Order.  “Order to General Scott.” 1861. In Abraham 
Lincoln: Complete Works, Comprising His Speeches, Letters, State Papers, and 
Miscellaneous Writings, edited by John G. Nicolay and John Hay.  New York: 
The Century Co., 1894. 
 
“Military Commission Transcript.” Quoted in Samuel Klaus, ed. The Milligan Case. New 
York: Knopf, 1929. 
 
Speed, James.  “Argument of James Speed for the United States.” Quoted in Samuel 
Klaus, ed. The Milligan Case. New York: Knofp, 1929.   
 
Stanbery, Henry. “Argument in the Supreme Court of the United States on the Side of the 
United States.” Quoted in Samuel Klaus, ed. The Milligan Case. New York: 
Knopf, 1929. 
 
U.S. Congress.  Congressional Globe. 39th Cong., 1st sess. 
 
U.S. Congress.  Congressional Globe. 39th Cong., 2nd sess.  
 
U.S. Congress.  Congressional Globe.  40th Cong., 2nd sess.  
 
 
  
147 
 
Personal Papers  
Browning, Orville Hickman. The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning.  Edited by 
Theodore Pease and J.G. Randall. Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 
1925.  
  
David & Sarah Davis Family Correspondence. David Davis Mansion Historic Site, 
Bloomington, Illinois.     
 
Lincoln Abraham. Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works, Comprising His Speeches, 
Letters, State Papers, and Miscellaneous Writings. Edited by John G. Nicolay and 
John Hay. New York: The Century Co., 1894. 
 
Lincoln, Abraham. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume V. Edited by Roy 
Basles.  New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953.   
 
Lincoln, Abraham. “Corning Letter.” In Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: 
Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War, Mark Neely, Jr. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011. 
 
Lincoln, Abraham.  The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress.  
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/malhome.html. 
 
 
Public Addresses  
Garland, Judge Merrick. “President Obama Supreme Court Nomination Announcement.” 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?406805-1/president-obama-supreme-court-
nomination-announcement. 
 
Lincoln, Abraham. “Speech on the Dred Scott Decision.” Springfield: IL, June 26, 1857 
in Maureen Harrison, ed. Abraham Lincoln: Word for Word. San Diego: Excellent 
Books, 1994.  
 
 
Books and Pamphlets  
Binney, Horace. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution. 
Philiadelphia: Sherman & Sons, 1862.  
  
Craighill, William P. The Army Officers Pocket Companion for Staff Officers in the Field. 
New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862. 
 
Klaus, Samuel ed. The Milligan Case. New York: Knopf, 1929. 
 
Lieber, Francis. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863.   
  
148 
 
 
 
The 1863 Laws of War. Washington: War Department, 1863.  
 
The American Law Review. (April 1867, I, 572). In The Supreme Court in United States 
History, Charles Warren. Vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935. 
 
 
Newspapers  
Arkansas Gazette. December 19, 1866. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
Chicago Times. March 17, 1863. Quoted in Craig D. Tenney. “To Suppress or Not to 
Suppress: Abraham Lincoln and the Chicago Times.” Civil War History 27, no. 3 
(September 1981): 248-259.  
 
Chicago Tribune. January 4, 1867. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
Indianapolis Journal. May 8, 1863. Quoted in Willard L. King. Lincoln’s Manager: 
David Davis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.  
 
Louisville Democrat. January 5, 1867. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
Newark Evening Courier. January 2, 1867. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971.  
 
New York Herald. January 2, 1867. Quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in 
United States History. vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935.  
 
New York Herald. January 23, 1867. Quoted in Charles Warren. The Supreme Court in 
United States History. vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935. 
 
New York Times. January 3, 1867. Quoted in Charles Warren. The Supreme Court in 
United States History. vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935. 
 
New York World. January 12, 1867.  Quoted in Charles Warren. The Supreme Court in 
United States History. vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935. 
 
Pantagraph. January 8, 1867. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
  
149 
 
Picayune. January 8, 1867. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
Springfield Republican. January 2, 1867. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
The Enquirer. December 19, 1866. Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
The Nation. 3:510 (December 27, 1866). Quoted in Charles Fairman. History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971. 
 
“The New Dred Scott.” Harper’s Weekly. January 19, 1867. Quoted in Robert 
Fridlington. The Reconstruction Court. New York: Associated Faculty Press, 
1987.  
 
 
Legal Cases 
Barron v. Baltimore. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).  
 
Boumediene v. Bush. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 
Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
 
Ex parte McCardle. 74 U.S. 506 (1869). 
 
Ex parte Merryman. 17 Fed. 144, 147 (No. 9,487) (D.C. Md. 1861). 
 
Ex parte Milligan. 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866). 
 
Ex parte Quirin. 317 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 
Ex parte Vallandigham. 68 U.S. 1 Wall. 243 253 (1863).   
 
Fletcher v. Peck. 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
 
Georgia v. Stanton. 6 Wallace 50 (1867). 
 
Hamdi v. Rumsfield. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 
Jecker v. Montgomery. 13 How. (54 U.S.) 498, 515 (1852). 
 
  
150 
 
Mississippi v. Johnson. 4 Wallace 475 (1867). 
 
Padilla v. Hanft. 423 F.3d 386 4th Cir. (2005). 
 
People v. Hill. (June 12, 1854).  
 
Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
 
The Brig Amy Warwick, The Schooner Crenshaw, The Barque Hiawatha, and The 
Schooner Brilliante. 67 U.S. 635 (1863).   
 
 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
Books 
Benedict, Michael Les. A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and 
Reconstruction, 1863-1869. New York: Norton & Company, 1974.  
 
Bishop, Joseph W. Justice Under Fire: A Study of Military Law. New York: 
Charterhouse, 1974. 
 
Blair, William C. With Malice Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014.    
 
Brandwein, Pamela. Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
 
Brown, Thomas J., ed. Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the Postbellum United 
States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
Burgess, John W. Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law. Boston: Ginn 
& Company, 1891. Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and 
Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013): 355-379.      
 
Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Freedom of Speech. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. 
Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana 
Magazine of History 4 (December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Churchill, Robert H. To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face: Libertarian Political 
Violence and the Origin of the Militia Movement. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2009.  
 
  
151 
 
Cole, Arthur C. Constitutional Debates of 1847. Springfield: Illinois State Historical 
Library, 1919.  
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction in America. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962. 
 
Fairman, Charles. History of the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1971.  
 
Farber, Daniel. Lincoln’s Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
 
Fisher, Louis. Military Tribunals & Presidential Power: American Revolution to the War 
on Terrorism. Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2005. 
 
Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1988. 
 
Fridlington, Robert. The Reconstruction Court. New York: Associated Faculty Press, 
1987.  
 
Friedman, Lawrence M. A History of American Law. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1973. 
 
Friedman, Leon and Louis H. Israel, eds. The Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court. New York: R.R. Bowker, 1969.  
 
Garraty, John A., ed.  Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution. New York: Harper, 
1964. 
 
Gillette, William. Retreat From Reconstruction: 1869-1879. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University, 1979. 
 
Hall, Kermit L. The Magic Mirror: Law in American History. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. 
 
Herndon, William and Jesse W. Weik. Herndon’s Lincoln. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2006.   
 
Holt, Michael. The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and 
the Onset of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
 
Horwitz, Morton. Transformation of American Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977. 
 
  
152 
 
Hyman, Harold.  A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
on the Constitution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.  
 
Hyman, Harold and William M. Weicek. Equal Justice Under the Law: Constitutional 
Development, 1835-1875. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.  
 
King, Willard L. Lincoln’s Manager: David Davis. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1960.  
 
Klement, Frank L. Copperheads in the Middle West. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960. 
 
Klement, Frank L. Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason 
Trials in the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Press University, 1989.   
 
Kutler, Stanley. Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968). Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and 
Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013):355-379.  
 
Les Benedict, Michael. A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and 
Reconstruction, 1863-1869. New York: Norton & Company, 1974. 
 
Les Benedict, Michael. Preserving the Constitution: Essays on Politics and the 
Constitution in the Reconstruction Era. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2006. 
 
McGinty, Brian.  Lincoln & The Court. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.  
 
Miller, William Lee. Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2002.  
 
Moore, William F. and Jane Anne Moore. Collaborators for Emancipation: Abraham 
Lincoln and Own Lovejoy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014.  
 
Neely, Mark Jr. Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the 
American Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.  
 
Neely, Mark Jr. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991.  
 
Novak, William J. The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century 
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
 
  
153 
 
Randall, James G. Constitutional Problems under Lincoln. New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1926. Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and 
Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Rehnquist, William H. All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime. New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1988.  
 
Schlesigner, Arthur M. The Age of Jackson. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953.  
 
Schroeder, Christopher and Curtis A. Bradley, eds. Presidential Power Stories. St. Paul: 
Foundation Press, 2009.  
 
Schweber, Howard. The Creation of American Common Law, 1850-1880. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
  
Sprague, Dean. Freedom Under Lincoln. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. 
 
Towne, Stephen E. Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate 
Conspiracies in America’s Heartland. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015.  
 
Warren, Charles. The Supreme Court in United States History. vol. II. Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1935. 
 
Weber, Jennifer. Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Weik, Jesse. The Real Lincoln: A Portrait. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923.  
 
White, Ronald C. A. Lincoln: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2009.  
 
Witt, John Fabian. Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History. New York: 
Free Press, 2012.  
 
 
Articles 
Bader, William D. and Frank J. Williams. “David Davis: Lawyer, Judge, and Politician in 
the Age of Lincoln.” Roger Williams University Law Review 14 (Spring, 2009): 
163-214.   
 
Barnett, Randy E. “From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief Justice: The Remarkable but 
Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase.” Georgetown University Law Center 63 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. (2013): 653-702. 
 
  
154 
 
Barry, Peter J. “Ex parte Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 
4 (December 2013): 355-379. 
 
Barry, Peter J. “’I’ll keep them in prison awhile…’: Abraham Lincoln and David Davis 
on Civil Liberties in Wartime.” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 28, 
no. 1 (Winter 2007): 20-29.  
 
Benedict, Michael Les.  “Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment.” Maryland Law Review. 71 no.1 (2011): 163-188.    
 
Bradley, Curtis A. “The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, 
and Congressional Authorization.” In Presidential Power Stories, edited by 
Christopher H. Schroeder and Curtis A. Bradley, 93-132.  St. Paul: Foundation 
Press, 2009.  
 
Curry, Richard O. "Copperheadism and Continuity: the Anatomy of a Stereotype." 
Journal of Negro History 57, no. 1 (January 1972): 29-36.  
 
Dueholm, James A. “Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: An Historical 
& Constitutional Analysis.” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 29, no. 2 
(Summer 2008): 47-66.  
 
Dunning, William A. “The Constitution of the United States in Reconstruction.” Political 
Science Quarterly 2 (December 1887): 558-602. Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex 
parte Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 
(December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Fairman, Charles. “The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency.” Harvard Law 
Review 55 (June 1942): 1253-1302. Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: 
History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013): 355-
379.  
 
Fisher, Louis. “Military Tribunals: Historical Patterns and Lessons.” Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress. Washington D.C.: The Library of 
Congress (July 9, 2004): 1-45.    
 
Fisher, Sydney G. “The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion.” 
Political Science Quarterly 3 (September 1888): 454-488. Quoted in Peter J. 
Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 
4 (December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Fitzgerald, Michael W. “Reconstruction Politics and the Politics of Reconstruction.” In 
Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the Postbellum United States, edited by 
Thomas J. Brown, 91-116.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
  
155 
 
 
Fletcher, Henry J. “The Civilian and the War Power.” Minnesota Law Review 2 (1917): 
730-755.  Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and Historians.” 
Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Foner, Eric. “Dare Call It Treason.” The Nation (June 2, 2003): 13. Quoted in Peter J. 
Barry. “Ex parte Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 
4 (December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Frank, John P. “Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii.” 
Columbia Law Review 44 (September 1944): 639-688.  Quoted in Peter J. Barry. 
“Ex parte Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 
(December 2013): 355-379.  
 
Friedman, Leon. “Salmon P. Chase.” In The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 
edited by Leon Friedman and Louis H. Israel, 1113-1149. New York: R.R. 
Bowker, 1969.  
 
Gambone, Joseph G. “Ex Parte Milligan: The Restoration of Judicial Prestige?” Civil 
War History 16 (September, 1970): 246-259.  Quoted in Peter J. Barry. “Ex parte 
Milligan: History and Historians.” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 
2013): 355-379.  
 
Meites, Jerome B. “The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention and Persons of Color.” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 108, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 266-295.   
 
Nevins, Allan. “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator.” In Quarrels That Have 
Shaped the Constitution, edited by John A Garraty, 101-118. New York: Harper, 
1964, 108.  
 
Oakes, James. “Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, States’ Rights, and Black Rights: 
Another Look at Lincoln.” In Our Lincoln, edited by Eric Foner, 109-134. New 
York: W.W. Norton: November, 2008):  
 
Petlack, Karin. “A Dilemma of Civil Liberties: Blacks under Union Military Control, 
1861-1866.” PhD diss., University of California, Berkley, 2013.  
 
Pratt, Harry E. “David Davis.” PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1930.  
 
Rockenbach, Stephen I. “A Border City at War: Louisville & the 1862 Invasion of 
Kentucky.” Ohio Valley History. 3, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 35-52.   
 
Stephens, Gail.  “This City Must Not Be Taken.” Traces of Indiana & Midwestern 
History. 22, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 4-17.    
  
156 
 
 
Tenney, Craig D. “To Suppress or Not to Suppress: Abraham Lincoln and the Chicago 
Times.” Civil War History. 27, no. 3 (September 1981): 248-259.   
 
Towne, Stephen E. “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, 
and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863.” Civil War History 
52, no. 1 (March 2006): 41-65.  
 
Towne, Stephen E. “The Persistent Nullifier: The Life of Civil War Conspirator Lambdin 
P. Milligan.” Indiana Magazine of History 109 (December 2013): 303-354. 
 
Towne, Stephen E. “Worse than Vallandigam: Governor Oliver P. Morton, Lambdin P. 
Milligan, and the Military Arrest and Trial of Indiana State Senator Alexander J. 
Douglas During the Civil War.” Indiana Magazine of History 106 (March 2010): 
1-39.  
 
Vagts, Detlev F. “Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction Chapter.” 
American University International Law Review 23, no. 2 (2007): 231-274. 
 
Yoo, John. “Merryman and Milligan.” Journal of Supreme Court History 34 (November 
2008): 505-534.  
